Managed Competition: A U.S. Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World
有管理的竞争：应对多极世界的美国大战略
Executive Summary摘要
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated pre-existing momentum toward a multipolar global order. In response, the Biden administration effectively rallied NATO and ensured that Russian forces cannot resubjugate Ukraine. But it has not anchored its tactical moves in a broader strategy to safeguard America’s most critical interests. As a result, we are fast headed toward a two-front geopolitical faceoff in which a belligerent Russia and a rising China are cooperating closely with each other against the United states.
俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵加速了先前存在的全球多极秩序的势头。作为回应，拜登政府有效地团结了北约，并确保俄罗斯军队不能再征服乌克兰。但它并没有将其战术行动锚定在更广泛的战略中，以保护美国最关键的利益。因此，我们正迅速走向两条战线的地缘政治对峙，在这场对峙中，交战的俄罗斯和崛起的中国正在密切合作对抗美国。
A dangerous gap has emerged between Washington’s global ambitions and its ability to achieve them.
华盛顿的全球野心与其实现这些野心的能力之间出现了危险的差距。
In a world in which power is shifting from the West toward the East and Global South, the United States is enmeshed in a proxy war with the world’s largest nuclear power, and Americans face mounting political and social challenges at home, a dangerous gap has emerged between Washington’s global ambitions and its ability to achieve them. The United States had a large margin for strategic error during its era of post-Cold War global primacy, when it faced no significant great power challengers. It has no such cushion today. America needs to rethink its grand strategy.
在一个权力从西方向东方和全球南方转移的世界里，美国陷入了与世界上最大的核大国的代理人战争，美国人在国内面临着越来越大的政治和社会挑战，华盛顿的全球野心与其实现这些野心的能力之间出现了危险的差距。美国在冷战后全球主导的时代有很大的战略失误余地，当时它没有面临重大的大国挑战者。今天没有这样的缓冲。美国需要重新思考其大战略。
This should involve the following elements:这应包括以下要素：
• Recognize that attempts to isolate and weaken Russia and China are likely to fail. The combination of Russia’s vast natural resources and China’s economic heft and centrality to global commerce present a challenge far different from what we faced during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union posed a military and ideological threat but was economically feeble.
认识到孤立和削弱俄罗斯和中国的企图很可能会失败。俄罗斯庞大的自然资源与中国的经济实力和在全球商业中的中心地位相结合，带来了一个与冷战时期截然不同的挑战，当时苏联构成了军事和意识形态威胁，但经济实力较弱。
• Avoid promoting regime change or otherwise undermining political and economic stability in Russia and China, which could have serious blowback effects in the United States. The United States’ economic health is to a great degree dependent on that of China. Information technology has made us vulnerable to external subversion at a time when American society is dangerously divided and mistrustful of key institutions.
•避免推动政权更迭或以其他方式破坏俄罗斯和中国的政治和经济稳定，这可能会对美国产生严重的反作用。美国的经济健康状况在很大程度上取决于中国。在美国社会存在危险的分裂和对关键机构的不信任之际，信息技术使我们容易受到外部颠覆。
• Instead, pursue a strategy of managed competition, in which our rivals are not only counterbalanced by American power and alliances, but also are constrained by agreed rules of the game that are tailored to an era in which advances in precision weaponry, cyber technology, and artificial intelligence pose significant new threats to stability.
•相反，追求一种有管理的竞争战略，在这种战略中，我们的竞争对手不仅被美国的力量和联盟所制衡，而且还受到商定的游戏规则的约束，这些规则是为精确武器、网络技术和人工智能的进步对稳定构成重大新威胁的时代量身定制的。
• Be more selective about where the United States should focus its involvement. As a seapower dependent on trade and robust international partnerships, the United States must remain engaged with the world. But Washington can no longer afford to squander its resources on quixotic democratization crusades or on policing regions that are not central to America’s own well-being. Greater burden sharing by allies and partners is essential.
•对美国应将其参与重点放在哪些方面要更有选择性。作为一个依赖贸易和强大国际伙伴关系的海洋大国，美国必须继续与世界接触。但华盛顿再也不能把资源浪费在不切实际的民主化运动上，也不能浪费在对美国自身福祉不重要的地区的治安上。至关重要的是，盟国和合作伙伴应分担更大的负担。
• Aim to gain a breathing spell abroad so that we can focus on healing our domestic wounds and advancing prosperity at home. This also means that the United States should avoid framing its global challenges in terms of an existential battle between democracy and authoritarianism.
•目标是在国外获得喘息的机会，以便我们能够专注于治愈国内创伤和促进国内繁荣。这也意味着，美国应该避免将其全球挑战定义为民主和威权主义之间的生存之战。
Introduction 介绍
Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has greatly narrowed Russia’s strategic playing field by alienating the West and cementing Russian dependence on China and the Global South. But it has also dealt a staggering blow to the Biden administration’s nascent grand strategy.弗拉基米尔·普京对乌克兰的入侵极大地缩小了俄罗斯的战略竞争环境，疏远了西方，巩固了俄罗斯对中国和全球南方的依赖。但这也对拜登政府刚刚起步的大战略造成了惊人的打击。
When Biden entered office he identified the rise of China as the United States’ chief geopolitical challenge. His team said that their goal was to stabilize the U.S.-Russian relationship and to end our “endless wars” in order to facilitate a strategic focus on Beijing. He simultaneously sought to rally the world’s democracies against the challenge of authoritarianism, strengthen what he called the rules-based international order, and promote global cooperation on critical transnational problems such as climate change and contagious disease. This approach would, in turn, enhance global stability and prosperity for the American people, thereby constituting a “foreign policy for the middle class.”
当拜登上任时，他将中国的崛起视为美国的主要地缘政治挑战。他的团队表示，他们的目标是稳定美俄关系，结束我们“无休止的战争”，以促进对北京的战略关注。他同时寻求团结世界民主国家应对威权主义的挑战，加强他所说的基于规则的国际秩序，并促进在气候变化和传染病等关键跨国问题上的全球合作。这种做法反过来将增强全球稳定和美国人民的繁荣，从而构成“中产阶级的外交政策”。
Great power competition has escalated into open conflict, the risk of nuclear confrontation has increased, and the space for international cooperation on climate and contagion has narrowed to a sliver.
大国竞争升级为公开冲突，核对抗的风险增加，在气候和传染问题上的国际合作空间缩小到一点点。
Russia’s attack on Ukraine exposed the significant gaps and contradictions of this strategy. Our pre-war insistence on deepening U.S. and NATO military cooperation with Ukraine — once described by CIA director Bill Burns as the “brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite” — while cheerleading for Putin’s domestic political opponents proved incompatible with the goal of stabilizing relations with Moscow.4 Vast swaths of the Global South have resisted Biden’s admonitions that they must side with the West in a Manichean face-off with Russia, China, and other authoritarians.
While few support Putin’s invasion, many sympathize with Russian and Chinese accusations that rules-based order is merely code for Washington’s belief that it should determine when to enforce rules and when to exempt itself and its allies.6 Outside of Western Europe, much of the world has grown weary of America’s self-appointed role as moral arbiter of their domestic political progress. Contrary to Biden’s hopes, great power competition has escalated into open conflict, the risk of nuclear confrontation has increased, and the space for international cooperation on climate and contagion has narrowed to a sliver.
俄罗斯对乌克兰的攻击暴露了这一战略的重大差距和矛盾。 我们战前坚持深化美国. 和北约与乌克兰的军事合作-曾经被中央情报局局长比尔伯恩斯描述为"俄罗斯精英所有红线中最亮的" — 而为普京的国内政治对手拉拉队证明与稳定与莫斯科关系的目标不相容。全球南方的大片地区抵制了拜登的警告，即他们必须站在西方一边，与俄罗斯，中国和其他威权主义者进行摩尼教对峙。虽然很少有人支持普京的入侵，但许多人同情俄罗斯和中国的指责，即基于规则的秩序仅仅是华盛顿认为应该决定何时执行规则以及何时免除自己，西欧以外, 世界上许多国家已经厌倦了美国自我任命的国内政治进步道德仲裁者的角色。 与拜登的希望相反，大国竞争升级为公开冲突，核对抗的风险增加，气候和传染方面的国际合作空间缩小到一丁点儿。
The Biden team has adjusted course quite nimbly in forging a united Western response to Russia’s attack and ensuring that Putin cannot succeed in subjugating Ukraine. But there is danger that its tactical decisions in thwarting Russian ambitions will become a substitute for a broader grand strategy that more closely aligns American objectives with its core interests and capabilities.
The United States enjoyed a large margin of strategic error during its era of hegemony, when it faced no peer or even near-peer competitors. Its failures proved damaging but far from fatal. That is unlikely to be true in a multipolar world in which direct warfare between nuclear powers has become a real possibility, digital technologies make the United States more vulnerable than ever to external sabotage and subversion, and the frightful realities of climate change have become increasingly apparent. To avoid failures that could truly threaten America’s security and well-being, we need a new strategic approach.
拜登团队非常灵活地调整了路线，以形成西方对俄罗斯袭击的统一反应，并确保普京无法成功征服乌克兰。 但是，它在挫败俄罗斯野心方面的战术决策有可能成为更广泛的大战略的替代品，而这一战略将使美国的目标与其核心利益和能力更加一致。 美国在其霸权时代享有很大的战略误差，当时它没有面对同行甚至近乎同行的竞争对手。 它的失败证明具有破坏性，但远非致命性。 在一个多极世界中，核大国之间的直接战争已成为现实的可能性，数字技术使美国比以往任何时候都更容易受到外部破坏和颠复，气候变化的可怕现实 为了避免可能真正威胁美国安全和福祉的失败，我们需要一种新的战略方针。
An emerging disorder一种正在出现的混乱
What world order will emerge from the war in Ukraine is unclear. But no matter when or how this war ends — in unconditional victory, negotiated settlement, volatile stalemate, or devastating escalation — it will leave in its wake changed dynamics among the world’s key players and new threats to American interests. Putin has brought the so-called post-Cold War era to an emphatic end.
乌克兰战争将产生什么样的世界秩序尚不清楚。但无论这场战争何时或如何结束——以无条件的胜利、谈判解决、动荡的僵局或毁灭性的升级——它都将在世界关键参与者之间留下变化的动态和对美国利益的新威胁。普京有力地结束了所谓的后冷战时代。
Russia’s early misfires in the war have badly damaged its ability to wield power and influence in the world. Viewed through the lens of moral justice, this can only be applauded. But we must resist the temptation to believe that a severe weakening of Russia would be an unalloyed good for U.S. national interests; nor should it be a primary strategic goal. Moscow’s reliance on its nuclear arsenal and its dependence on China have already grown commensurately with its stumbles in Ukraine, and the potential for crises to flow from Russia’s embitterment, disarray, or even state collapse — and from the temptations of others to exploit Moscow’s troubles — could become quite problematic for the United States and Europe.
俄罗斯早期在战争中的失误严重损害了其在世界上行使权力和影响力的能力。从道德公正的角度来看，这只能是值得赞扬的。但我们必须抵制这样的诱惑，即认为俄罗斯的严重削弱将完全有利于美国的国家利益；也不应将其作为主要战略目标。莫斯科对其核武库的依赖和对中国的依赖已经随着其在乌克兰的失误而相应增加，而俄罗斯的痛苦、混乱甚至国家崩溃以及其他国家利用莫斯科麻烦的诱惑所带来的危机可能会给美国和欧洲带来很大问题。
Similarly, so long as the war in Ukraine continues, broader stability in Europe and Eurasia will be an elusive goal. The Russian military appears incapable of conquering and occupying the whole of Ukraine. But Ukraine appears equally incapable of driving Russian forces out of its territory. Absent some strategic truce between Russia, Ukraine, and the West over Ukraine’s geopolitical alignment, Russia is likely to opt for turning Ukraine into a bleeding wound in the center of Europe, incapable of joining NATO, but quite capable of radiating problems into the broader region.
同样，只要乌克兰战争继续，欧洲和欧亚大陆更广泛的稳定将是一个难以捉摸的目标。俄罗斯军队似乎没有能力征服和占领整个乌克兰。但乌克兰似乎同样无力将俄罗斯军队赶出其领土。如果俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方之间没有就乌克兰的地缘政治结盟达成一些战略休战，俄罗斯很可能会选择将乌克兰变成欧洲中心的流血伤口，无法加入北约，但很有能力将问题辐射到更广泛的地区。
Alongside this roiling of Europe and Eurasia, the United States faces a formidable — but not automatically adversarial — peer in the People’s Republic of China. China is not just a rising military power, but, unlike the autarkic Soviet Union, is also an economic and technological giant that is deeply integrated into the world’s financial system, supply chains, and commercial markets.
The West has united impressively in response to Russia’s brutality in Ukraine, but the EU remains ambivalent toward Beijing, and if the war in Ukraine drags on and leads to a significant economic recession, the importance of strong trade relations with China will only grow for Europeans. Moreover, the independent-minded Global South has largely resisted U.S. demands to impose sanctions on Russia, and has proved even more reluctant to pick sides between the United States and China.7 Beijing’s focus on striking business deals and building infrastructure is resonating with African, Asian, and Latin American states alienated by American reproaches for their corruption and democratic failings.
除了欧洲和欧亚大陆的动荡之外，美国在中国面临着一个强大的—但不是自动的对抗—对等体。 中国不仅仅是一个正在崛起的军事强国，而且与自给自足的苏联不同，它也是一个深度融入世界金融体系、供应链和商业市场的经济和技术巨头。 西方对俄罗斯在乌克兰的残暴行为做出了令人印象深刻的反应，但欧盟对北京仍持矛盾态度，如果乌克兰战争持续下去并导致严重的经济衰退，那么与中国建立强有力的贸易关系对欧洲人来说的重要性只会增加。 此外，具有独立意识的全球南方在很大程度上抵制了美国。 要求对俄罗斯实施制裁，事实证明更不愿意在美国和中国之间挑边。中国政府对达成商业交易和建设基础设施的关注引起了非洲、亚洲和拉丁美洲国家的共鸣，这些国家因腐败和民主失败而受到美国的指责而疏远。
Meanwhile, the rules of the game that might keep global and regional tensions within safe bounds suffered a pair of severe blows this year, following several decades of erosion. The first was Russia’s blatant violation of international law and core principles of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe in launching its invasion of Ukraine. Russia also broke a longstanding taboo against openly threatening to use nuclear weapons. Putin reportedly believes the West has abandoned the Cold War-vintage rules of the game and that Russia is now in a fight unconstrained by any agreed boundaries.
与此同时，可能将全球和地区紧张局势控制在安全范围内的游戏规则在经历了几十年的侵蚀后，今年遭受了两次严重打击。首先是俄罗斯在入侵乌克兰时公然违反国际法和欧洲合作与安全组织的核心原则。俄罗斯还打破了长期以来反对公开威胁使用核武器的禁忌。据报道，普京认为西方已经放弃了冷战时期的游戏规则，俄罗斯现在正在进行一场不受任何商定边界约束的战斗。
In a multipolar world in which Russia and China are partnered against us all but officially and the Global South largely refuses to choose sides, a defensive focus on isolating and punishing our chief adversaries will fail to win substantial support outside the West.
在一个多极世界里，俄罗斯和中国几乎是正式的伙伴关系，而全球南方基本上拒绝选边站队，专注于孤立和惩罚我们的主要对手的防御将无法赢得西方以外的实质性支持。
The second was Washington’s corresponding seizure of Russian foreign exchange funds held in Western banks. This display of raw financial power was meant to coerce Moscow, but it also sent a shot across the bow of every government in the world, calling into question the sanctity of their property rights and the reliability of monetary exchange. It is unclear how much this has chastened or alarmed key actors in the Global South, many of whom were already inclined to worry much more about reckless U.S. power than Russian aggression.
But the unintended knock-on effects of this move — which followed a similar American freezing of Afghanistan’s foreign exchange holdings following the Taliban’s return to power — could be quite significant in our interconnected world. Globalization has been an enormous generator of international wealth over the past several decades, however unevenly distributed it may be. A descent into full-scale economic warfare and mercantilism could have profound implications for the economic health and political stability of the United States and the world.
第二个是华盛顿相应地扣押了在西方银行持有的俄罗斯外汇基金。 这种原始金融力量的展示是为了胁迫莫斯科，但它也向世界上每个政府发出了一枪，质疑他们财产权的神圣性和货币交换的可靠性。 目前还不清楚这对全球南方的关键行动者造成了多大的打击或恐慌，其中许多人已经倾向于更多地担心鲁莽的美国权力，甚于俄罗斯的侵略。但是，这一举措的意外连锁反应-—在塔利班重新掌权后，美国也冻结了阿富汗的外汇资产—-在我们这个相互联系的世界中可能会产生相当大的影响。 在过去几十年中，全球化是国际财富的巨大来源，无论其分布多么不均衡。 陷入全面的经济战和重商主义可能对美国和世界的经济健康和政治稳定产生深远的影响。
Managing the new era 管理新时代
These circumstances impose real constraints on the strategic options the United States faces. In a multipolar world in which Russia and China are partnered against us all but officially and the Global South largely refuses to choose sides, a defensive focus on isolating and punishing our chief adversaries will fail to win substantial support outside the West.
But because digital technology has made us vulnerable to highly destructive sabotage and subversion in our domestic affairs, and because our economic, health, and climate security are so interwoven with those of China and other nations, neither can we risk an offensive strategy of rolling back or changing the regimes in Moscow and Beijing. Instead, we need a strategy of managed competition, in which our rivals’ freedom of maneuver is limited not just by countervailing American power, but also by agreed rules of the game that are tailored to contemporary circumstances, and which allow cooperation on key transnational challenges.
这些情况对美国面临的战略选择施加了真正的制约。在一个多极世界里，俄罗斯和中国几乎是正式的伙伴关系，而全球南方基本上拒绝选边站队，专注于孤立和惩罚我们的主要对手的防御将无法赢得西方以外的实质性支持。但是，由于数字技术使我们在国内事务中容易受到极具破坏性的破坏和颠覆，而且我们的经济、健康和气候安全与中国和其他国家的安全交织在一起，我们也不能冒险采取倒退或改变莫斯科和北京政权的进攻性战略。相反，我们需要一种有管理的竞争战略，在这种战略中，我们的竞争对手的行动自由不仅受到对抗美国力量的限制，还受到针对当代环境的商定游戏规则的限制，这些规则允许在关键的跨国挑战上进行合作。
Our primary means of managing great power competition and containing regional conflicts should be traditional counterbalancing, which employs a combination of U.S. military power, offshore balancing combined with core alliances, trade preferences, and economic assistance to defend and promote stability in key parts of the world. Not all regions are of equal importance to U.S. interests, nor do we have the wherewithal to police all of them. Preventing a potential nuclear attack or military invasion against the United States or our treaty allies is essential; we rightly regard preventing any hostile power from controlling Europe, Eurasia, or sea routes on which our trade, energy supplies, and naval operations depend as critical to our nation’s well-being. Ensuring that the United States has sufficient military power and alliance support to deter or counter threats to these vital interests should remain a central plank of this country’s grand strategy.
我们管理大国竞争和遏制地区冲突的主要手段应该是传统的平衡，它将美国的军事力量、离岸平衡与核心联盟、贸易优惠和经济援助相结合，以捍卫和促进世界关键地区的稳定。并非所有地区对美国的利益都同等重要，我们也没有必要监管所有地区。防止对美国或我们的条约盟友的潜在核攻击或军事入侵至关重要；我们正确地认为，防止任何敌对势力控制欧洲、欧亚大陆或我们的贸易、能源供应和海军行动所依赖的海上路线，对我们国家的福祉至关重要。确保美国拥有足够的军事力量和联盟支持，以威慑或对抗对这些重要利益的威胁，仍然是美国大战略的核心内容。
It is important, however, that we do not conflate creating an international environment safe for the functioning of America’s democracy with intrusive efforts to make the world democratic. The belief that the United States can be truly secure only when the rest of the world looks like us — and that we can conclusively solve such problems as terrorism and “rogue states” through operations to remove recalcitrant leaders — has underpinned the disastrous regime change operations of the past 25 years, alienated significant parts of the Global South, and caused Russia and China to fear that the United States poses a deadly threat to their security and internal stability.
然而，重要的是，我们不要将为美国民主的运作创造一个安全的国际环境与使世界民主的侵入性努力混为一谈。只有当世界其他地区看起来像我们时，美国才能真正安全——我们才能通过罢免顽固不化的*的行动最终解决恐怖主义和“流氓国家”等问题——这一信念支撑了过去25年灾难性的政权更迭行动，疏远了全球南方的大部分地区，并使俄罗斯和中国担心美国对他们的安全和内部稳定构成致命威胁。
It is important that we do not conflate creating an international environment safe for the functioning of America’s democracy with intrusive efforts to make the world democratic.
重要的是，我们不要将为美国民主的运作创造一个安全的国际环境与使世界民主的侵入性努力混为一谈。
Our contrasting approaches to the first and second Gulf Wars illustrate these precepts. Following erstwhile Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States rightly judged that the attack both undermined an important international norm and threatened energy flows in a region critical to American security.11 In a diplomatic tour de force, the George H. W. Bush administration put together a broad international coalition against Iraq that included what Secretary of State James Baker called “breathtaking Soviet support” and gained the blessing of the United Nations Security Council for a military operation to defend Kuwait.12 The U.S. military made short work of driving the invaders back into Iraq.
我们对第一次和第二次海湾战争的截然不同的态度说明了这些原则。1990年，伊拉克前*萨达姆·侯赛因入侵科威特后，美国正确地判断，这次袭击既破坏了一项重要的国际准则，也威胁到了对美国安全至关重要的地区的能源流动。在一次外交访问中，乔治·H·W·布什政府组建了一个广泛的国际反伊拉克联盟，其中包括国务卿詹姆斯·贝克所说的“苏联的惊人支持”，并获得了联合国安理会的批准，采取军事行动保卫科威特。美国军方在将入侵者赶回伊拉克方面做得很短。
The White House then faced an important decision: should American troops pursue and destroy the retreating Iraqi military and force Saddam Hussein from power? Despite some dissenting voices, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft argued successfully against such a course, worrying that it would fracture the international coalition, saddle Washington with responsibility for governance in Baghdad, and undermine regional stability by destroying the delicate balance of power between Iraq and Iran.13 Some dozen years later, many of the dissenters got an opportunity to “finish the job” in Baghdad and democratize Iraq.14 Subsequent events have shown there is great wisdom in knowing when to stop.
白宫随后面临一个重要决定：美国军队是否应该追击并摧毁撤退的伊拉克军队，迫使萨达姆·侯赛因下台？尽管有一些反对声音，国家安全顾问布伦特·斯考克罗夫特还是成功地反对了这一方针，他担心这会破坏国际联盟，让华盛顿承担巴格达治理的责任，并破坏伊拉克和伊朗之间微妙的力量平衡，破坏地区稳定。大约十几年后，许多持不同政见者有机会在巴格达“完成任务”，使伊拉克民主化。随后发生的事件表明，知道何时停止是非常明智的。
From rupture to rules 从破裂到规则
Prudent counterbalancing and deterrence alone cannot contain the dangers posed by the rupture in relations between Russia and the West – e.g., nuclear confrontation, unregulated arms races, no-holds-barred hybrid warfare, and large-scale cyber subversion and sabotage . Just as we did during the Cold War, when the United States and Soviet Union recognized that the consequences of superpower conflict in the nuclear era created a shared interest in keeping their rivalry within safe bounds, we must establish rules of the game for a multipolar era to manage threats that cannot be addressed through American might alone.
仅靠谨慎的制衡和威慑无法遏制俄罗斯与西方关系破裂带来的危险，例如核对抗、不受管制的军备竞赛、无限制的混合战争以及大规模网络颠覆和破坏。正如我们在冷战期间所做的那样，当美国和苏联认识到核时代超级大国冲突的后果为将其竞争控制在安全范围内创造了共同利益时，我们必须为多极时代制定游戏规则，以管理无法仅靠美国力量解决的威胁。
Nuclear arms control tops the list of urgently needed rules and regulations. Russia might compensate for its inability to match an expanding NATO’s conventional power with new deployments of nuclear weapons directed at Europe and the United States. Following NATO’s announcement that Sweden and Finland would join the organization, Russia explicitly threatened to station nuclear weapons in its western border areas.
核军备控制是当务之急。俄罗斯可能会用针对欧洲和美国的新核武器部署来弥补其无法与不断扩大的北约常规力量相匹配的不足。在北约宣布瑞典和芬兰将加入该组织后，俄罗斯明确威胁要在其西部边境地区部署核武器。
But unlike the 1980s, when the Soviet Union deployed theater-range weapons in Europe that prompted U.S. counter-deployments and put nuclear security on a hair-trigger, these deployments could occur at a time when the United States and Russia have almost no arms control dialogue. And they may well come in the context of an expanding and modernizing Chinese nuclear arsenal, which could result in a situation where it will be impossible for the United States to maintain nuclear parity with the combined forces of Russia and China. Nuclear war is the clearest and most urgent existential threat facing the United States. Finding a way to contain these dangers through formal or informal arms control and confidence-building measures is essential.
核军备控制是迫切需要的规则和条例的首位。 俄罗斯可能会弥补其无法通过针对欧洲和美国的新部署核武器来匹配不断扩大的北约常规力量的不足。 在北约宣布瑞典和芬兰将加入该组织之后，俄罗斯明确威胁要在其西部边境地区部署核武器。但与20世纪80年代不同，当时苏联在欧洲部署战区武器促使美国 反部署并将核安全置于一触即发，这些部署可能发生在美国和俄罗斯几乎没有军备控制对话的时候。 它们很可能是在中国核武库不断扩大和现代化的背景下出现的，这可能导致美国不可能与俄罗斯和中国的联合力量保持核平等。核战争是美国面临的最明显、最紧迫的生存威胁。 必须找到通过正式或非正式军备控制和建立信任措施遏制这些危险的办法。
We must establish rules of the game for a multipolar era to manage threats that cannot be addressed through American might alone.
我们必须为多极时代制定游戏规则，以应对仅靠美国力量无法解决的威胁。
In the realm of technology, America’s information-age advancements have made our nation much more capable but paradoxically less secure. Cyber attackers currently have enormous advantages over cyber defenders.17 The United States can inflict significant digital damage on its adversaries, but it is highly vulnerable to attacks on its own networks. Given the degree to which America’s military, economy, and critical infrastructure depend on the digital domain — with vanishingly few manual back-up systems in place — the stakes of failure in this area could be existential. An agreement on where red lines should be drawn in the cyber arena is critically important.18
在技术领域，美国信息时代的进步使我们的国家更有能力，但矛盾的是，它的安全性降低了。网络攻击者目前比网络防御者具有巨大优势。美国可以对其对手造成重大的数字破坏，但它极易受到本国网络的攻击。考虑到美国的军事、经济和关键基础设施对数字领域的依赖程度——几乎没有手动备份系统——这一领域的失败可能是存在的。就网络领域的红线划定达成一致至关重要。
None of this will be possible, however, absent an understanding that ends the confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine. Like Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, Putin’s attack on Ukraine violated key international norms in a region important to U.S. interests, demanding a strong American-led response. But just as in Iraq, there is an important distinction between repelling Putin’s transgression and fostering regime change in Moscow or bringing Ukraine into the Western orbit.
The key to arresting the escalation spiral in which the United States and Russia are currently trapped is not an unsavory territorial concession by Ukraine to Russia; it is reestablishing a norm that the United States and Soviet Union observed after the Cuban missile crisis, but which has eroded since the Cold War ended: That nuclear powers should respect each other’s critical red lines near their borders and in their internal affairs. That would not mean abandoning Ukraine to Moscow’s domination; it would require safeguarding Ukraine outside both the American and Russian spheres.
然而，如果没有达成结束俄罗斯和西方在乌克兰问题上的对抗的谅解，这一切都是不可能的。 就像萨达姆*侯赛因入侵科威特一样，普京对乌克兰的攻击违反了一个对美国利益重要的地区的关键国际规范，要求美国领导的强有力的回应。 但就像在伊拉克一样，击退普京的违法行为与促进莫斯科政权更迭或将乌克兰带入西方轨道之间存在重要区别。 遏制美国和俄罗斯目前陷入的升级螺旋的关键不是乌克兰对俄罗斯的令人讨厌的领土让步；它正在重建美国和苏联在古巴导弹危机后观察到的、但自冷战结束以来已经受到侵蚀的规范：核大国应该尊重彼此在边界附近和内政上的关键红线。 这并不意味着放弃乌克兰到莫斯科的统治;这将需要在美国和俄罗斯领域之外保护乌克兰。
Is seeking such understandings quixotic? Perhaps. Given the depth of mistrust and misperception between the United States, Russia, and China, discussion about rules poses a daunting challenge. But the alternative, as illustrated by events in Ukraine, is likely to be an ever more destructive descent into direct great power warfare. As Henry Kissinger observed, history has shown that stability is possible only when all major powers accept the international order as legitimate, “so that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy.”19 In contemporary times, this buy-in ought also to extend to middle powers, most of which are in the Global South.
寻求这样的理解是不切实际的吗？可能鉴于美国、俄罗斯和中国之间的不信任和误解之深，关于规则的讨论构成了一个艰巨的挑战。但另一种选择，正如乌克兰事件所表明的那样，很可能是更具破坏性的直接大国战争。正如亨利·基辛格所言，历史表明，只有当所有大国都接受国际秩序是合法的时，稳定才有可能实现，“这样，没有哪个国家会像凡尔赛条约后的德国那样，对革命性的外交政策表示不满。” 在当代，这种接受也应该延伸到中等大国，其中大部分在全球南方。
Bridging the gap 缩小差距
Just as in the Cold War, America’s ultimate strategic asset in the emerging multipolar order is not military or economic power but the vitality of its society and democratic system. A firm foundation of freedom and prosperity at home will reduce U.S. vulnerability to foreign political subversion, foster respect and emulation in other nations, and ground its foreign policies in confidence and resilience.
正如在冷战中一样，美国在新兴多极秩序中的最终战略资产不是军事或经济力量，而是其社会和民主制度的活力。国内自由和繁荣的坚实基础将减少美国受到外国政治颠覆的脆弱性，促进其他国家的尊重和效仿，并使其外交政策建立在信心和韧性之上。
Over the past 30 years, however, yawning gaps have emerged not just between America’s ambitions in the world and its capacity for achieving those goals, but also between a Washington foreign policy elite too focused on promoting U.S. primacy and political change abroad, and the vital needs of ordinary Americans yearning for greater stability and prosperity at home. Failed crusades abroad and a misguided belief that U.S. security depends on maintaining global hegemony have weakened, not strengthened, American society.
然而，在过去的30年里，美国在世界上的雄心和实现这些目标的能力之间，以及过于专注于促进美国在国外的首要地位和政治变革的华盛顿外交政策精英与渴望国内更大稳定和繁荣的普通美国人的重要需求之间，都出现了巨大的差距。失败的海外十字军东征和美国安全取决于维持全球霸权的错误信念削弱了而不是加强了美国社会。
In 1969, Richard Nixon faced a situation similar to our current circumstances following his first presidential victory. America was sharply divided over Vietnam, civil rights, and generational change. Healing the nation required ending the war in Southeast Asia without tilting the strategic landscape in Moscow’s favor. The Soviet Union was on course to push past parity with the United States in nuclear weapons, and already enjoyed an overwhelming numerical advantage in conventional forces in Europe. How could the United States extract itself from Vietnam and promote domestic healing, yet still contend effectively with the Soviet threat?
1969年，理查德·尼克松在第一次赢得总统大选后，面临着与我们目前类似的情况。美国在越南、民权和代际变化问题上存在严重分歧。治愈这个国家需要在不使战略格局向有利于莫斯科的方向倾斜的情况下结束东南亚战争。苏联正朝着在核武器方面超越美国的方向前进，并且在欧洲的常规部队中已经拥有压倒性的数量优势。美国如何从越南撤军并促进国内康复，但仍能有效应对苏联的威胁？
Failed crusades abroad and a misguided belief that U.S. security depends on maintaining global hegemony have weakened, not strengthened, American society.
失败的海外十字军东征和美国安全取决于维持全球霸权的错误信念削弱了而不是加强了美国社会。
Nixon’s answer was neither to withdraw into Fortress America nor to appease America’s rivals. Rather, he deepened and diversified America’s engagement with the world by opening the door to relations with Maoist China — an odious regime still in the throes of the Cultural Revolution — and creating an important counterweight to rising Soviet power. In parallel, he pursued a set of trade, arms control, human rights, and confidence-building agreements that constrained the Soviet build-up, reduced the threat of nuclear war, and made U.S.-Soviet relations more manageable and predictable.
尼克松的回答既不是撤回美国堡垒，也不是安抚美国的竞争对手。相反，他通过打开与中国的关系之门，加深了美国与世界的接触，并使其多样化，……他还为崛起的苏联力量创造了一个重要的制衡力量。与此同时，他推行了一系列贸易、军备控制、人权和建立信任协议，这些协议限制了苏联的建设，减少了核战争的威胁，并使美苏关系更易于管理和预测。
Similarly , the chief strategic challenge Washington faces today is not to win a decisive battle between freedom and tyranny but to gain a breathing spell abroad that will allow the country to focus on desperately needed internal recovery. Unlike the Nixon era, the circumstances we face today preclude driving a strategic wedge between Moscow and Beijing. But with wise statecraft, we can nonetheless stop driving our rivals toward anti-American partnership.
同样，华盛顿今天面临的主要战略挑战不是赢得自由和暴政之间的决定性战斗，而是在国外获得喘息的机会，使国家能够专注于急需的内部复苏。与尼克松时代不同的是，我们今天面临的情况阻止了在莫斯科和北京之间制造战略隔阂。但有了明智的治国方略，我们仍然可以停止驱使我们的对手走向反美伙伴关系。
Bringing our international ambitions back into line with the core interests of the American people is an urgent requirement. This means protecting the United States from attacks, subversion, and other threats to its domestic prosperity and way of life — not pursuing American primacy in the world or transforming other nations into democracies. John Quincy Adams once remarked to Russia’s ambassador to the United States that “each Nation is exclusively the judge of the government best suited to itself, and … no other Nation may justly interfere by force to impose a different Government upon it.” It is time for Washington to return to this standard. Our grand strategy should serve as the shield, not the sword, of the American republic.
当务之急是使我们的国际野心与美国人民的核心利益保持一致。这意味着保护美国免受攻击、颠覆和其他对其国内繁荣和生活方式的威胁，而不是追求美国在世界上的首要地位或将其他国家转变为民主国家。约翰·昆西·亚当斯（John Quincy Adams）曾对俄罗斯驻美国大使表示，“每个国家都是最适合自己的政府的法官，……没有其他国家可以公正地通过武力干预，将不同的政府强加给它。”华盛顿是时候回到这一标准了。我们的大战略应该成为美利坚共和国的盾牌，而不是剑。
About the Author 关于作者
George Beebe is Director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute. He spent more than two decades in government as an intelligence analyst, diplomat, and policy adviser, including as director of the CIA’s Russia analysis and as a staff adviser on Russia matters to Vice President Cheney. His book, The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe, published in 2019, warned how the United States and Russia could stumble into a dangerous military confrontation.
George Beebe是昆西研究所的大战略总监。他在政府工作了20多年，担任情报分析师、外交官和政策顾问，包括中央情报局俄罗斯分析主任和副总统切尼的俄罗斯事务幕僚顾问。他于2019年出版的《俄罗斯陷阱：我们与俄罗斯的影子战争如何演变成核灾难》一书警告说，美国和俄罗斯可能会陷入危险的军事对抗。
Managed Competition: A U.S. Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World
https://quincyinst.org/report/managed-competition-a-u-s-grand-strategy-for-a-multipolar-world/
