Good afternoon! And welcome to the last class. How to start a start-up? So this is a little bit different than every other class.
大家下午好，欢迎来到最后一课，创业公司如何起步。我讲的与其他课程有点不同。
Every other class has been things that you should be thinking about in general at the beginning of a Startup.
其他所有类别都是您在初创公司开始时应该普遍考虑的事情。
And today, we're going to talk about things that you don't have to think about for a while.
今天，我们将讨论一些您暂时不必考虑的事情。
In fact, you shouldn't.
事实上，你不应该。
But since, I'm not going to get to talk to most of you, again before you get to sort of post-product market fit stage.
但因为，在你们进入产品后市场适应阶段之前，我不会再和你们大多数人交谈。
I wanted to just give you the list of things that you need to think about as your Startup scales, and the list of the things that usually.
我只想给你一份清单， 列出你在创业公司规模扩大时需要考虑的事情，以及通常需要考虑的事情的清单。
Founder failed to make the transition on.
创始人未能成功完成转型。
So these are the topics we're going to talk about but again all of these things are things that are not writing code or talking to users.
所以这些是我们将要讨论的主题，但同样，所有这些事情都不是编写代码或与用户交谈。
Which means, with a few exceptions that I'll try to note, you can ignore them until after you have product market fit.
这意味着， 除了我会尽力注意的一些例外情况之外，您可以忽略它们， 直到您的产品适合市场为止。
Most of these things, for most companies, become important between months 12 and 24. But it's really more about stage than anything else.
对于大多数公司来说，这些事情中的大多数在第 12 个月到第 24 个月之间变得很重要。 但实际上， 舞台比其他任何事情都重要。
These are things that usually hit around 25 people and definitely post product-market fit.
这些事情通常会影响 25 人左右，并且肯定会发布产品与市场的契合度。
So just write these down somewhere and look back at them when you get there.
因此，只需将这些写下来，当你到达那里时再回顾它们。
So the first area we're going to talk about is Management.
所以我们要讨论的第一个领域是管理。
At the beginning of a company there is no management, and this actually works really well.
公司成立之初是没有管理层的，这实际上非常有效。
Before 20 or 25 employees most companies are structured with everyone reporting to the founder, it's totally flat.
在员工数量达到 20 到 25 名之前， 大多数公司的结构都是每个人都向创始人汇报，这是完全扁平化的。
And that's really good, and that's what you want, and at that stage that is the optimal way, for product, that's the optimal structure for productivity.
这真的很好，这就是你想要的，在那个阶段这是产品的最佳方式，这是生产力的最佳结构。
But the thing that tricks people is that when, when lack of structure fails, it fails all at once.
但欺骗人们的是，当缺乏结构失败时，它就会立即失败。
And so what works totally fine at 20 employees, is from zero to 20 employees?
那么，对于 20 名员工来说，什么是完全可行的呢？是从 0 到 20 名员工吗？
Is disastrous at 30. And so you want to be aware that this transition will happen.
30 岁时是灾难性的。所以你要知道这种转变将会发生。
And you don't actually need to make the structure complicated.
而且您实际上不需要使结构变得复杂。
In fact, you shouldn't.
事实上，你不应该。
All you need is for every employee to know, who their manager is?
您所需要的只是让每个员工都知道他们的经理是谁？
And every, and there should be exactly one.
每一个，而且应该恰好有一个。
And, and every manager should know, who their direct reports are?
而且，每个经理都应该知道，他们的直接下属是谁？
You want to ideally cluster people in teams that make sense of course.
当然,理想情况下,您希望将人们聚集在有意义的团队中。
But the most important thing is that there's just clear reporting structure.
但最重要的是，只有清晰的报告结构。
And that everyone knows, what it is.
每个人都知道它是什么。
And if you want to make changes to it people sort of understand how to make changes or to hire someone.
如果你想对其进行更改，人们就会了解如何进行更改或雇用某人。
Clarity and simplicity are the most important things here.
清晰度和简单性是这里最重要的事情。
But failing to do it is really bad.
但做不到这一点确实很糟糕。
So, because it works in the early days to have no structure at all, and, because it sort of feels cool to have no structure.
所以，因为它在早期完全没有结构，而且因为没有结构感觉很酷。
Many companies are like, we're going to try this crazy new management theory and have no structure.
许多公司都说，我们要尝试这种疯狂的新管理理论，但没有任何结构。
What you want to do is innovate on your product and your your business model?
您想做的是对您的产品和商业模式进行创新？
Management structure is not, where I would recommend trying to innovate.
管理结构不是，我建议尝试创新。
So, don't make the mistake of having- >> >> Nothing but don't make the other mistake of having something super complicated.
所以，不要犯“什么都没有”的错误，但也不要犯“拥有超级复杂的东西”的错误。
A lot of people fall into this trap, where they think it's like you know, people feel cool if they're someones manager.
很多人都陷入了这个陷阱，他们认为就像你知道的那样，如果他们是某人的经理， 人们就会感觉很酷。
And if they're just an employee they don't feel cool.
如果他们只是一名员工，他们就不会感觉很酷。
So people come up with these convoluted circular matrices management structures, where you report to this person for this thing, and this person for that thing, and this person for that thing.
因此，人们提出了这些复杂的循环矩阵管理结构，你向这个人汇报这件事，向这个人汇报那件事，再向这个人汇报那件事。
But you know, actually this person reports to you for this thing.
但你知道吗，其实这个人是向你汇报这件事的。
That's a mistake too.
这也是一个错误。
So don't, don't try to innovate here.
所以不要,不要试图在这里创新。
This is the first instance of an important shift, in companies, or in, in, in the founders job.
这是公司或创始人工作中发生重要转变的第一个例子。
Before product market fit your only job that matters is to build a great product, right, you're number one job is to build a great product.
在产品适应市场之前， 你唯一重要的工作就是打造一款出色的产品，对吧， 你的首要任务就是打造一款出色的产品。
As the company grows and at about this, you know, 25 or so employee size, your main job shifts from building a great product.
随着公司的发展，到了员工规模达到 25 人左右的时候，你的主要工作就不再是开发出色的产品了。
To building a great company, and it stays there for the rest of your time.
建立一家伟大的公司，并在你余下的时间里一直留在那里。
And this is probably the biggest shift in being a founder that ever happens.
这可能是创始人经历过的最大转变。
There are four failure cases we see all the time, as founders become managers.
当创始人成为管理者时，我们经常看到四种失败案例。
So I want to talk about the four most common ones.
所以我想谈谈最常见的四种。
The first one is being afraid to hire senior people.
第一个是害怕雇用高级人才。
In the early days of a Startup, hiring senior people is usually a mistake.
在初创公司的早期，雇用高级人才通常是一个错误。
You just want people that get stuff done.
你只是想要那些把事情做好的人。
and, and the willingness to work hard and aptitude matters more than experience.
而且，努力工作的意愿和能力比经验更重要。
As the company starts to scale, and about this time when you have to put in place a basic management structure.
随着公司开始规模化，大约这个时候你必须建立一个基本的管理结构。
It is actually valuable to have senior people on the team.
团队中拥有资深人士实际上很有价值。
You know, executives that have built companies before.
你知道，那些以前创办过公司的高管。
And almost all founders after the first time they hire a really great executive and that executive takes over big pieces of the business and just makes them happen the founder says, wow, I wish I had done that earlier.
几乎所有的创始人在第一次聘请一位非常优秀的高管后， 这位高管接管了大部分业务， 并让它们发生，创始人说，哇，我希望我早点这样做。
But everybody makes this mistake and waits to long to do this, so don't, don't be afraid to hire senior executives.
但每个人都会犯这个错误， 并且等待很长时间才这样做，所以不要、不要害怕雇用高级管理人员。
The second mistake is hero mode.
第二个错误是英雄模式。
So, I will use the example of say someone that runs the customer service team.
因此，我将使用一个管理客户服务团队的人的例子。
Someone runs the customer service team, they want to lead by example, this starts from a good place, it's, it's the extreme of leading by example.
有人管理客户服务团队，他们想要以身作则， 这是从一个好的地方开始的，这是， 这是以身作则的极端。
It's saying, you know what, I want my team to work really hard.
它的意思是，你知道吗，我希望我的团队非常努力地工作。
Rather than tell them to work hard I'm going to set an example and I'm going to work 18 hours a day.
我不会告诉他们要努力工作，而是要树立榜样，我要每天工作 18 小时。
And I'm going to show people how to get a lot of tickets done.
我将向人们展示如何获得大量门票。
But then the company starts growing.
但随后公司开始发展。
Also they have the normal discomfort of assigning a lot of work to other people.
此外，他们也会因将大量工作分配给其他人而感到不舒服。
So the company starts growing and the ticket volume, keeps going up, and now they have to do like 19 hours a day, and then 20 hours a day, and it's just obviously, not working.
于是公司开始发展， 门票量不断增加，现在他们必须每天工作 19 小时，然后是每天 20 小时，这显然是行不通的。
But they won't stop and hire people, because they're like, if I stop, even for one day, we're going to get behind on tickets.
但他们不会停下来雇用人，因为他们就像， 如果我停下来， 即使是一天，我们也会在门票上落后。
The only way to get out of hero mode in this case is to say, you know, what?
在这种情况下，摆脱英雄模式的唯一方法就是说，你知道吗？
we're going to get behind on tickets for two or three weeks, because I'm going to go off.
我们的票将会拖欠两到三周，因为我要出发了。
And I'm going to hire three more support team members and I've calculated based off our growth rate that this is going to last this long.
我将再雇用三名支持团队成员，我根据我们的增长率计算出这将持续这么长时间。
And next time, I'm not going to make the same mistake.
下一次,我不会再犯同样的错误。
I'll get ahead of it and hire again.
我会抢先一步并再次雇用。
But you actually have to make a tradeoff.
但实际上,你必须进行欺骗。
You actually, have to say, you know, what?
事实上，你必须说，你知道吗？
I need to hire more people and we're going to get behind on other stuff.
我需要雇用更多的人，而我们在其他事情上会落后。
That is the right answer.
这是正确的答案。
The wrong answer is to stay in hero mode until you burnout, which is what most people do.
错误的答案是保持英雄模式直到精疲力竭，这正是大多数人所做的。
Third mistake bad delegation.
第三个错误是糟糕的授权。
Most founders have not managed people before and they certainly haven't managed managers.
大多数创始人以前没有管理过人员，当然也没有管理过经理。
And so the way that the bad way you delegate is you say hey, employee, we need to do this big thing.
所以你授权的糟糕方式是你说，嘿，员工，我们需要做这件大事。
You go off and research it.
你去研究一下。
Come back to me with all the data and the trade-offs, I'll make a decision and tell it to you, and then you'll go off and implement it.
带着所有的数据和权衡回到我身边，我会做出决定并告诉你，然后你会去实施它。
That's how most founders delegate, and that does not make people feel good and it certainly doesn't scale.
这就是大多数创始人的授权方式，这不会让人们感觉良好，而且肯定无法扩大规模。
A subtle difference but really important is to say, hey, you're really smart, that's why I hired you.
一个微妙但非常重要的区别是，嘿， 你真的很聪明， 这就是我雇用你的原因。
You go off, here are the things to think about, here's what I think, but you make this decision.
你走开，这是要考虑的事情，这是我的想法，但你做出这个决定。
I totally trust you, and let me know what you decide.
我完全信任你,让我知道你的决定。
That's the delegation that actually works.
这就是实际运作的代表团。
because, I think, because Steve Jobs was able to get away with the former and make every decision himself, and people just put up with it.
因为，我认为，因为史蒂夫·乔布斯能够摆脱前者， 自己做出每一个决定，而人们只是忍受它。
And every founder thinks they're the next Steve Jobs.
每个创始人都认为自己是下一个史蒂夫·乔布斯。
A lot of people try this.
很多人都在尝试这个。
But I, for 99.9% of people.
但我，对于99.9%的人来说。
The second method here works a lot better.
这里的第二种方法效果更好。
And then the fourth area is just a personal organization one.
第四个区域只是个人组织区域。
When you are working on product, you don't actually need to be that organized in terms of how you run a company, and how you talk to people about what they're working on.
当你从事产品工作时，你实际上不需要在如何经营公司以及如何与人们谈论他们正在做的事情方面有条理。
But if you fail to get your own personal organization system right.
但如果你未能正确建立自己的个人组织体系。
where you can keep track in some way of what you need to do, and what everybody else is doing, and what you need to follow up with them on.
你可以以某种方式跟踪你需要做什么，其他人在做什么， 以及你需要跟进他们做什么。
That will come back to bite you, so developing this early as the company begins to scale is really important.
这会回来咬你，所以在公司开始扩大规模时尽早开发这一点非常重要。
Two other things that we hear again and again from our founders, they wished they had done earlier.
我们从我们的创始人那里一遍又一遍地听到另外两件事，他们希望自己早点做。
And that is simply writing down, how you do things?
那就是简单地写下来,你如何做事?
And why you do things?
你为什么做事？
These two things, the how and the why, are really important.
这两件事，“如何”和“为什么”，非常重要。
I mean early there is you just tell everyone, employee, when you're, like, sitting around, having lunch or dinner, you know?
我的意思是，早些时候你就告诉每个人，员工，当你坐在一起吃午餐或晚餐时，你知道吗？
This is how we think about building products, this is how we push production, you know, this is how we handle customer support, whatever.
这就是我们构建产品的方式，这就是我们推动生产的方式，你知道，这就是我们处理客户支持的方式，等等。
As you get bigger, you can't keep doing that.
当你变得更大时，你就不能再这样做了。
And if you don't do it, someone else is just going to say it.
如果你不这样做，别人就会说出来。
But if you write it down, and put it up on a Wiki or whatever, that every employee reads.
但是，如果你把它写下来，放在一个维基或其他什么地方，每个员工都会阅读。
You as the founder get to basically, write the law.
作为创始人，你基本上可以制定法律。
And, and if you write this down it will become law in the company.
而且，如果你把这个写下来，它将成为公司的法律。
And if you make everyone read this as the company hires 100 and then 1,000 employees people will read this and say, all right, that's how we do things.
如果你让每个人都读到这篇文章， 因为公司雇佣了 100 名员工， 然后是 1,000 名员工， 人们会读到这篇文章并说，好吧，这就是我们做事的方式。
If you don't do it it will be like random oral tradition of whatever the hiring manager or their best friend that they make at their first week in the company tells them.
如果你不这样做，这就像招聘经理或他们最好的朋友在公司第一周告诉他们的随机口头传统一样。
So writing down how you do things?
那么写下你是如何做事的？
And the why?
为什么？
The why is the culture of values, Brian Chesky talked about this really well.
为什么是价值观文化，布莱恩·切斯基（Brian Chesky）对此谈得很好。
Every founder I know wishes that they'd written down both of these, the how and the why, earlier.
我认识的每一位创始人都希望他们早点写下这两点：如何做和为什么做。
To just establish it as the company grows, and then this becomes what happens.
随着公司的发展而建立它，然后就会发生这样的事情。
I think it's one of the highest leverage things that you can do that, that people don't.
我认为这是你能做到但人们却做不到的最具影响力的事情之一。
All right.
好的。
Next area, HR.
下一个领域，人力资源。
HR is another thing that most people correctly ignore in the first phase of a Startup because again, it's not writing code.
人力资源是大多数人在初创公司第一阶段正确忽视的另一件事，因为它不是编写代码。
It's not talking to users.
它不是与用户交谈。
But it's a huge mistake to continue to ignore it.
但继续忽视它是一个巨大的错误。
And the reason that I think most founders ignore it, is they have in their mind this idea of, like TV sitcom HR, you know, awfulness.
我认为大多数创始人忽略它的原因是，他们脑海中有一种想法，就像电视情景喜剧《人力资源》一样， 你知道， 很糟糕。
But it doesn't have to slow you down.
但它并不一定会让你放慢速度。
Actually, it speeds you up.
事实上,它加速了你。
Most founders will say, out of one side of their mouth, people are our most important asset.
大多数创始人都会从他们的嘴里说，人才是我们最重要的资产。
And, the other side, we don't want any HR.
而另一方面,我们不需要任何HR。
So, what they mean is, we don't want HR.
所以，他们的意思是，我们不需要人力资源部。
We don't want, like, the bad kind of TV HR.
我们不想要那种糟糕的电视人力资源。
What good HR means is, a few things.
好的HR意味着什么,有几件事。
A clearer structure, which Charlie talked about.
查理谈到了更清晰的结构。
You know, a path for people about, how they can evolve their careers?
你知道，这是一条人们如何发展职业生涯的道路吗？
Most important, one of the most important things is Performance Feedback.
最重要的是，最重要的事情之一是绩效反馈。
again, this happens organically early on, people know how they're doing.
再说一次，这种情况很早就发生了，人们知道他们在做什么。
As the company gets to 25, 30, 45 people, that gets lost and it doesn't have to be complex.
当公司人数达到 25、30、45 人时，这种情况就会消失，而且也不必太复杂。
It can be super simple but there should be a way that it happens and it shoulder be frequent.
它可以非常简单，但应该有一种发生的方式，并且应该经常发生。
You know, people need to hear pretty quickly, how they're doing?
你知道，人们需要很快听到他们过得怎么样？
And it should tie you know, if they're doing badly to a way you get them out of the company or if they, they doing well it should there should be a clear path to how this ties to compensation.
它应该与你让他们离开公司的方式联系在一起，或者如果他们做得很好，应该有一条明确的途径来说明这与薪酬的关系。
And that's the next thing.
那就是接下来的事情。
In the early days of a Startup.
在初创公司的早期。
People's compensation is whatever they negotiate with the founder, and it's all over the place.
人们的报酬是他们与创始人协商的任何东西，而且到处都是。
As you grow.
随着你的成长。
It feels hopelessly corporate, but it really is worth putting in place these compensation bands.
这让人感觉公司无可救药，但设立这些薪酬范围确实值得。
So a midlevel engineer is in this range.
所以中级工程师就在这个范围内。
A senior engineer's in this range.
高级工程师在这个范围内。
Here's how you move from this to this.
以下是您如何从这个转变到这个。
And it keeps things really fair.
而且它使事情变得非常公平。
Someday everyone will find that everyone else is comp.
总有一天,每个人都会发现其他人都很自负。
If it's all over the place it will be a complete meltdown disaster.
如果到处都是，那将是一场彻底的崩溃灾难。
If you put these bands in place early.
如果你早点把这些带子放在适当的位置。
It will at least be fair.
这至少是公平的。
It will also save you a lot of crazy negotiation.
这也会为你省去很多疯狂的谈判。
One thing that I think is really important when it comes to HR is equity.
我认为在人力资源方面非常重要的一件事是公平。
Most people get this right now for the early employees, they give them a lot of equity.
现在，对于早期员工来说，大多数人都得到了这一点，他们给了他们很多股权。
But I think you should continue to give a lot of equity all the way through.
但我认为你应该继续在整个过程中给予很多股权。
And, this is one place that your investors will always give you bad advice.
而且，在这一点上，你的投资者总是会给你不好的建议。
I think, not YC, but all other investors give bad advice here, most do.
我认为，不是 YC，而是所有其他投资者在这里给出了不好的建议，大多数人都这样做了。
You should be giving out a lot of equity to your employees.
您应该向员工发放大量股权。
now, this dilutes everyone, right, this dilutes you as the founder and the investors equally.
现在，这稀释了大家，对吧，这同样稀释了你作为创始人和投资者。
For some reason, founders usually understand this is good, investors are very shortsighted and don't want to dilute themselves.
出于某种原因， 创始人通常都明白这很好，投资者非常短视， 不想稀释自己。
So they'll like fight you over every equity grant.
所以他们会喜欢与你争夺每笔股权授予。
But we've seen a lot of data at YC now, and the most successful companies, and the ones where the investors do the best, end up giving a lot of stock out to employees, year after year after year.
但我们现在在 YC 看到了很多数据，最成功的公司，以及投资者做得最好的公司，最终年复一年地向员工发放大量股票。
So I tell founders like, you should think about, you know, for the next ten years, you're going to be giving out 3 to 5% of the company every year, because you just get bigger and bigger.
所以我告诉创始人， 你应该考虑一下，你知道，在接下来的十年里， 你每年都会捐出公司 3% 到 5% 的股份，因为你会变得越来越大。
So the individual grants get smaller, but in aggregate, it's a lot of stock.
因此，个人赠款变小了，但总的来说，这是很多存量。
And I think this is really important to do, if you value your people, you should be doing this.
我认为这非常重要，如果你重视你的员工，你就应该这样做。
specifically, you need to do this with refresher grants and you should get a, a plan in place for this early.
具体来说，您需要通过进修补助金来做到这一点，并且您应该尽早为此制定一个计划。
You know, I think, you never want an employee in a place where they vested three out of their four years of stock and they start thinking about leaving.
我认为，你知道，你永远不希望一名员工在一个地方，他们已经授予了四年股票中的三年，然后他们开始考虑离开。
So you should always stay in front of people's vesting schedules.
因此，您应该始终关注人们的兑现时间表。
And you know, how they plan early where you have refresher grants in place.
你知道，他们如何尽早计划你有进修补助金的地方。
There are a lot of new structures that people have been using here.
人们在这里使用了很多新的结构。
I personally like six year, big grants, but six years investing.
我个人喜欢六年的大额资助，但六年的投资。
because I think these companies just take a while to build.
因为我认为这些公司需要一段时间才能建立。
There's Pyramid Vesting where you back weight someone's grant, so in year four they get a lot more of the vesting than year one.
有金字塔归属， 你可以对某人的授予进行加权，因此在第四年他们获得的归属比第一年多得多。
There's a concept, different names for it, but something like continuous forward vesting, where people's grants are automatically reupped every year, at the same number of shares.
有一个概念，有不同的名称，但类似于连续的正向归属，人们的赠款每年都会以相同的股份数量自动重新增加。
Whatever you decide, get an option management system in place at about this point.
无论您做出什么决定，此时都要建立一个期权管理系统。
The normal way people do this is just someone keeps an Excel spreadsheet.
人们执行此操作的正常方式只是保留 Excel 电子表格。
I have seen mistakes that have cost employees or companies tens of millions of dollars because they didn't get this right.
我见过一些错误，这些错误导致员工或公司因为没有做好这一点而损失了数千万美元。
So there's really good option management systems or software and you should get those in place around this point.
因此，有非常好的期权管理系统或软件，您应该在这一点上将它们落实到位。
The other sort of HR stuff to touch on, there are a bunch of rules that change around 50 employees.
另一种人力资源方面的问题是，有一堆规则改变了大约 50 名员工。
Common examples are that you have to start sexual harassment training and diversity training there's a bunch of others as well.
常见的例子是，你必须开始性*扰培训和多元化培训，还有很多其他培训。
But just put a little pin in your mind that when you cross 50 employees there's a new set of HR rules that you have to comply with.
但是，只要记住一点，当你超过50名员工时，你必须遵守一套新的人力资源规则。
Monitor your team for burnout.
监控您的团队是否出现职业倦怠。
Again, it's up to product market fit it's just to Sprint, now it becomes a marathon.
再说一次，这取决于产品市场的适应性，这只是冲刺，现在它变成了一场马拉松。
At this point, you actually don't want people to work a hundred hours a week forever.
在这一点上，你实际上不希望人们永远每周工作一百个小时。
You want them to go on vacation.
你想让他们去度假。
You want them to have new challenges and do new things.
你希望他们接受新的挑战,做新的事情。
And if you let the whole company get burned out all at once, that, that is often a company-ending thing.
如果你让整个公司一下子被烧毁，那通常会导致公司的终结。
This is also a good time to put in place a, a hiring process.
这也是实施招聘流程的好时机。
Another thing that most founders regret is they don't hire as soon as everything is working, I think you should hire a full-time recruiter.
大多数创始人后悔的另一件事是， 他们不会在一切正常后立即招聘，我认为你应该聘请一名全职招聘人员。
If you do this too early, that's bad because you'll hire too fast, and that usually implodes.
如果你太早这样做，那就不好了，因为你会招聘得太快，而且通常会崩溃。
But, most founders get behind the ball on this.
但是，大多数创始人都支持这一点。
The other, there are a lot of other, sort of just hiring process tips.
另一方面，还有很多其他的招聘流程技巧。
For example, I think most companies, even until they get up to say 3 or 400 employees should announce every offer on some internal mailing list or something before they make it, because like half the time you do that, someone in the company will know something good or bad about that employee.
例如， 我认为大多数公司，即使在他们达到 3 或 400 名员工之前， 也应该在发布之前在内部邮件列表或其他内容上宣布每一项录用通知，因为有一半的时间你这样做，公司中的某个人会知道该员工的优点或缺点。
And the companies that I know that have instituted this have been really happy.
据我所知，实行这一制度的公司都非常高兴。
Also a good time to have a program in place to ramp up employees, so when someone starts, you know, what does their first week look like?
这也是制定员工培养计划的好时机，所以当有人开始工作时， 你知道， 他们的第一周会是什么样子？
How do they get, how do they get spun up?
它们是如何得到的，它们是如何旋转起来的？
How do they learn everything they need to learn?
他们如何学习他们需要学习的一切？
Are they going to have a buddy that's going to think through them?
他们会有一个朋友会考虑他们吗?
That's going to help them think through kind of everything about the company.
这将帮助他们思考有关公司的一切。
Here's one that you actually do need to think about before the 12 to 24 month mark, which is diversity on the team ,.
在 12 到 24 个月之前， 您确实需要考虑这一点，即团队的多样性。
The most common place this comes up honestly is people that hire, you know, all guys on their engineering team for the first 15 or 20 people.
老实说， 最常见的情况是，人们在前 15 或 20 名员工中雇佣了工程团队中的所有人员。
And in that point you get a culture in place that sort of takes on a life of it's own, and most founders that I've spoken to that have made this mistake regret it and they wished they had hired some diversity of perspective on the team early on.
在这一点上， 你就形成了一种具有自己生命力的文化，而我采访过的大多数创始人都对犯下的错误感到后悔， 他们希望他们在团队中聘用了一些具有多元化观点的人很早以前。
Engineering teams are not the only place where it comes up, but that's where you see it the most often, and if you get this right early you'll be able to grow the team much more quickly over, over the long-term.
工程团队并不是唯一出现它的地方，但这是你最常看到它的地方，如果你早点做对了，从长远来看，你将能够更快地发展团队。
The other thing to think about is what happens to your early employees.
另一件需要考虑的事情是你的早期员工会发生什么。
So, a common situation that happens is, the company evolves fast the early employees you know, the company, so like you hire an engineer who is a really great engineer, but then as the engineering team grows you need a VP of Engineering.
因此，常见的情况是，公司发展得很快， 你认识的早期员工就是公司，就像你聘请了一位非常优秀的工程师一样，但随着工程团队的发展， 你需要一名工程副总裁。
The early engineer wants to be the VP of Engineering, you can't do that, and but you don't the early employee to leave, they're an important, important part of the culture, they know a lot, people love them, and so I think you want to be very proactive about this.
早期工程师想成为工程副总裁，你不能这样做， 但你不会让早期员工离开，他们是文化的重要组成部分，他们知道很多， 人们喜欢他们， 所以我认为您希望对此非常积极主动。
You know, you want to like think about what's the path for my first 10 or 15 employees going to be as the company grows, and then just talk to them about it very directly, be up front, you know,.
你知道，你想想想随着公司的发展， 我的前 10 或 15 名员工将要走什么样的道路，然后非常直接地与他们交谈，坦率地说，你知道的。
I want, like sit them down and say, I want to talk about, sort of where you want to see your career go inside of this company.
我想让他们坐下来， 告诉他们，我想谈谈你希望看到你的职业生涯在这家公司的发展方向。
All right, so company productivity, this is something you don't need to think about in the early days because small teams are just sort of naturally productive most of the time.
好吧,公司生产力,这是你早期不需要考虑的事情,因为小团队在大多数时候都是自然而然的。
But as you grow, it the productivity I think goes down with the square of the number of employees if you don't make an effort because it sort of one of these like connections between nodes, every pair of people adds communication overhead.
但随着你的成长， 我认为如果你不努力， 生产力会随着员工数量的平方而下降， 因为它有点像节点之间的连接，每对人都会增加沟通开销。
And so if you don't start thinking about the systems that you're going to put in place, when the company is 25 to 50 people, to stay productive as you grow things will grind to a halt faster than you can imagine.
因此， 如果你不开始考虑你要建立的系统，当公司有25到50人时，随着你的成长而保持生产力， 事情就会比你想象的更快地停滞不前。
The single word that matters most, I think, to keep the company productive as it grows is alignment , .
我认为，要让公司在发展过程中保持生产力，最重要的一个词就是“一致性”。
The reason companies become unproductive is people are either not on the same page and you know, don't know what the same priorities are, or they're actively working against each other which is obviously worse.
公司生产力低下的原因是人们要么不在同一页面上， 你知道，不知道相同的优先事项是什么，要么他们积极地相互对抗， 这显然更糟糕。
But if you can keep the entire company aligned in the same direction, you'll have one well over half of the battle, and, and the way to start with this is just a very clear roadmap and goals.
但如果你能让整个公司朝着同一个方向保持一致，那么你就已经成功了一半，而且， 开始的方法就是一个非常明确的路线图和目标。
Everyone in the company should know what the roadmap for the next three or six months, or a year, depending on where the company is in its life cycle, looks like.
公司中的每个人都应该知道未来三六个月或一年的路线图是什么样的，具体取决于公司处于生命周期的哪个阶段。
You know, a classic test that I love to give is if I walk into a company getting, beginning to struggle with these scaling issues, I'll ask the founders, like, if I walked around and polled ten random employees and asked them what the top three goals for the company are, right now, would they all say the same thing?
你知道，我喜欢做的一个经典测试是， 如果我走进一家公司，开始与这些规模问题作斗争，我会问创始人， 就像，如果我四处走动， 随机调查十名员工， 问他们什么目前， 公司的三大目标是，他们都会说同样的话吗？
And a 100% of the time, the founder says, yes, of course they would, and I'd go do it, and 100% of the time, no two employees even say the same three, top three goals, in order.
创始人说，100% 的情况下，是的，他们当然会这么做，我也会这么做，而且 100% 的情况下，没有两名员工会按顺序说出相同的三个、前三个目标。
And founders can never believe it, because they're like well I announced that in all hands like three months ago what our goals were going to be, and how can they not remember?
创始人永远无法相信这一点， 因为他们就像我三个月前在所有人手中宣布的那样， 我们的目标是什么，他们怎么会不记得呢？
But it's really important to keep reiterating the, the message about the roadmap and the goals, and almost no founder does this enough.
但不断重申有关路线图和目标的信息确实很重要，而且几乎没有创始人在这方面做得足够。
And if you do it, you know the company will say, you know, all right, these are our goals, we understand them, we're going to get them done, I know self-organize around that.
如果你这样做了， 你知道公司会说，你知道，好吧，这些是我们的目标，我们理解它们， 我们将完成它们，我知道围绕这些目标进行自我组织。
But if people don't know what the roadmap of their goals are it won't happen.
但是，如果人们不知道他们的目标路线图是什么，它就不会发生。
We already talked about figuring out your values early, but I want to reiterate that because that also really help the company make the right decisions.
我们已经讨论过尽早弄清楚你的价值观，但我想重申这一点， 因为这也确实有助于公司做出正确的决定。
If everyone knows what the framework to decide is.
如果每个人都知道决定的框架是什么。
They'll make hopeful the same decisions if they're smart people.
如果他们是聪明人，他们也会做出同样充满希望的决定。
You want to continue to be run by great products and not process for its own sake, this is a fine, fine line.
你想继续被伟大的产品所经营， 而不是为了它本身而加工，这是一条细线。
Because you do need to put some process in place, but you never want to put process in place that rewards the process.
因为你确实需要制定一些流程，但你永远不想制定奖励流程的流程。
The focus has to always be on great product.
重点必须始终放在优质产品上。
One easy way to do this that a lot of companies try is they just say, we're going to ship something every day, and if you do that you know, there's at least a continued focus on delivery.
许多公司尝试的一种简单方法是， 他们只是说，我们每天都会发货，如果你这样做， 你知道，至少会持续关注交付。
And then transparency and rhythm in how you communicate are really important, most founders wait way too long on these, but having a management meeting every week, of just the people that report directly to the founder or the CEO, critical ,.
然后， 沟通方式的透明度和节奏非常重要，大多数创始人在这些方面等待了太长时间，但每周都要召开一次管理会议，只有直接向创始人或首席执行官汇报的人员参加，这一点至关重要。
All hands meetings not quite sure how often is optimal for those, at least once a month where you go through the results and the real map with the entire company really important.
全体员工会议不太确定多久一次对这些人来说是最佳的，至少每月一次， 你可以在其中查看结果以及整个公司的真实地图， 这非常重要。
And then, you know, doing a plan every quarter of what we're going to get down over the next three months and how that fits into our goals for the year, also becomes really important.
然后，你知道，每个季度制定一个计划， 说明我们将在接下来的三个月内完成哪些工作， 以及如何将其与我们今年的目标相契合，也变得非常重要。
I put offsites up there, because I don't think people do these nearly enough.
我把异地放在那里，因为我认为人们做得还不够。
A surprising number of the successful companies we've been involved with do a lot of offsites.
我们合作过的成功公司中，有数量惊人地开展了大量异地业务。
Where they'll take their best people for a weekend to a cabin in the woods or somewhere and just talk about.
他们会带最好的人去树林里的小屋或其他地方度过一个周末，然后只是谈论。
What do we want to be when we grow up?
我们长大后想做什么?
What are our most important things to be doing?
我们要做的最重要的事情是什么？
What are we not doing that we should be doing?
哪些是我们应该做而没有做的？
But get people out of the office and out of the day-to-day, everyone I know that does those thinks they're well worth the time.
但是让人们走出办公室， 走出日常工作，我认识的每个人都认为他们值得花时间。
So the goal in all of this productivity planning is that you're trying to build a company that creates a lot of value over a long period of time, and the long period of time is what's important here.
因此， 所有这些生产力规划的目标是， 你试图建立一家能够在很长一段时间内创造大量价值的公司，而长期是这里最重要的。
You can avoid all of this and just like with the authority of the founder make sure the company ships a great next version.
您可以避免所有这些，就像创始人的权威一样，确保公司发布出色的下一个版本。
But that won't work for version ten, it won't work for version 11. I, I really believe that this single hardest thing in business is building a company that does repeatable innovation and just has this ongoing culture of excellence as it grows.
但这不适用于版本 10，也不适用于版本 11。 我，我真的相信， 商业中最困难的事情是建立一家进行可重复创新的公司， 并在成长过程中拥有这种持续的卓越文化。
If you look at the examples of this most companies fail here.
如果你看看这些例子,大多数公司都会失败。
Most companies do one great thing where the founder just pushes to get it done and then don't innovate that well on follow on products.
大多数公司都在做一件伟大的事情，创始人只是推动完成它，然后在后续产品上没有那么好地创新。
And it really takes founders that think about how I'm going to do this second thing.
创始人确实需要考虑我将如何做第二件事。
This really hard thing.
这实在是一件很难的事情。
To get something like an Apple that can churn out great products for 30 or 40 years, or longer.
获得像苹果这样的东西，可以在 30 年、40 年甚至更长时间内生产出出色的产品。
All right, these are super tactical mechanics.
好吧,这些都是超级战术机制。
This is, this is definitely to just put on a list and remember these things for later.
这就是,这绝对是列个清单,以后记住这些东西。
All right in the early days, people basically ignore all accounting and they have, like, maybe if they're lucky, a shoebox full of receipts.
好吧，在早期，人们基本上忽略了所有的会计，他们拥有，如果幸运的话， 可能有一个装满收据的鞋盒。
They certainly don't have anything that looks like a financial report.
他们当然没有任何看起来像财务报告的东西。
This is a good time to get it in place.
这是落实到位的好时机。
You know, when things are working, say, month 18 or whatever.
你知道的,当事情进展顺利时,比如说18个月,或者其他什么时间。
You can do this with an outsourced person.
您可以与外包人员一起完成此操作。
Just say, you know what?
只是说，你知道吗？
We want, like to get our books in order.
我们希望把我们的书整理好。
We want to start getting audits every year.
我们希望每年开始接受审核。
We want to start a relationship with an accounting firm.
我们想与一家会计师事务所建立合作关系。
Easy to do.
容易做到。
Definitely worth it.
绝对值得。
This is also a good time to collect your legal documents.
这也是收集法律文件的好时机。
Because it's easy to fix things now.
因为现在修复问题很容易。
So, if you actually assign someone to go through and collect every agreement the company has ever signed.
所以，如果你真的指派某人去检查并收集公司曾经签署过的每一份协议。
Then when your landlord tries to **** you out of your lease and no-one can find the lease which happens like, half the time somehow someone will be able to find it.
然后，当你的房东试图将你从租约中抢走， 而没有人能找到租约时， 这种情况就会发生，一半的情况下， 有人会以某种方式找到它。
Also, you're almost certainly missing something.
而且，你几乎肯定错过了一些东西。
Some employee didn't sign their PIIA or whatever and you'll find it now.
有些员工没有签署 PIIA 或其他任何内容，您现在就会找到它。
It's easy to fix now.
现在很容易修复。
It gets really hard to fix, like, in the middle of your next round of financing.
它真的很难修复，就像在下一轮融资的中间一样。
So, again, this is time to bring, like, a little bit of the order to, to chaos.
所以，再次强调，现在是时候给混乱带来一点秩序了。
FF stock is a special class of stock for founders that the founders can sell in a later round, without messing up the common-stock valuation.
FF 股票是创始人的一类特殊股票， 创始人可以在以后的一轮中出售，而不会影响普通股的估值。
It used to be that most people set this up right when they started the company.
过去，大多数人在创办公司时就设置好了。
Founders fund sort of popularizes.
创始人的基金有点普及。
Which is why it's called FF stock.
这就是为什么它被称为 FF 库存。
But it became a really bad signal, right?
但这变成了一个非常糟糕的信号，对吗？
Founders that were obsessed with their own personal liquidity when the company had nothing turned out to like fail most of the time.
当公司一无所有时，创始人痴迷于自己的个人流动性，结果大多数时候都失败了。
And so investors learn that if founders pushed on this in the seed round it was a very, very bad sign.
因此投资者了解到， 如果创始人在种子轮中推动这一点，那是一个非常非常糟糕的迹象。
Most founders don't actually want to sell stock until the company is worth, like a billion dollars or something like that.
大多数创始人实际上并不想出售股票，直到公司价值达到 10 亿美元或类似的水平。
So, I think you can actually safely set this up after things start working, in the next financial round, and then you can sell it two, three, four years down the road.
所以，我认为你实际上可以在下一轮融资开始运作后安全地设置它，然后你可以在两年、三年、四年后出售它。
But it's a good thing to remember by about the time you get to the B round.
但是，在你进入B轮的时候记住这是一件好事。
IP, trademarks and patents.
知识产权、商标和专利。
actually, just IP and trademarks.
实际上，只是知识产权和商标。
So, you have 12 months, after you announce something, if you want to patent it.
所以，在你宣布某件事后，如果你想为其申请专利，你有 12 个月的时间。
And, if you miss that window, it's very hard to do.
而且，如果你错过了那个窗口，那就很难做到了。
so, 11 months after you launch, or first publicly talk about what you're doing.
所以，在你推出 11 个月后，或者第一次公开谈论你在做什么。
Is a good time to file provisional patents.
是申请临时专利的好时机。
We recommend people just file provisional patents.
我们建议人们只申请临时专利。
All that does is just hold your place in line at the patent office and it gives you another year to decide if you want to patent something or not.
所做的一切只是让您在专利局排队等候，然后再给您一年的时间来决定是否要为某些东西申请专利。
It only costs about $1000. It takes way less effort than a full patent.
只需花费约 1000 美元。它比完整的专利花费的精力要少得多。
And most of the time you'll know whether or not you need full patent a year later.
大多数时候，一年后您就会知道是否需要完整的专利。
But if you just do this one step, you'll at least have the option.
但只要你做到了这一步，你至少就有了选择。
It's also a good time to file trademarks for the U.S. and major international markets.
这也是为美国和主要国际市场申请商标的好时机。
again, if you don't do this at this stage, most people end up regretting it.
再说一次，如果你在这个阶段不这样做，大多数人最终都会后悔。
And while you're at it, a good time to grab all the domains.
而当你在它,一个好时机,抓住所有的域。
FP&A, good time also I think to think about someone to start doing FP&A.
FP&A，也是我想考虑有人开始做 FP&A 的好时机。
I think most companies don't end up realizing where the knobs on their financial model are until far too late.
我认为大多数公司最终都没有意识到他们的财务模型的旋钮在哪里，直到为时已晚。
And I think it turns out that if you have someone build a really great model of the business.
我认为事实证明，如果有人建立了一个非常出色的业务模型。
And by really great, apparently Roelof Botha, who was the PayPal CFO and built their FP&A model.
显然，Roelof Botha 非常出色，他是 PayPal 的首席财务官，并建立了他们的 FP&A 模型。
The top, the, like, the top sheet of his spreadsheet was 1,500 lines, just as a level of the detail people build these to.
他的电子表格的顶部有 1,500 行，就像人们构建这些表格的详细程度一样。
But you can really optimize the business and understand it at a level that I think most people totally miss.
但你确实可以优化业务并以我认为大多数人完全错过的水平来理解它。
Most people don't hire someone like this until they're many hundreds of employees.
大多数人直到员工人数达到数百人时才会雇用这样的人。
I think it's worth hiring earlier.
我认为尽早雇用是值得的。
Another thing that I think is worth hiring earlier that almost no one does is a full time fundraiser.
我认为值得尽早雇用但几乎没有人做的另一件事是全职筹款人。
Let's say you hire someone like really, really great and their full time job is to raise money for the company.
假设你雇佣了一个非常非常优秀的人，他们的全职工作就是为公司筹集资金。
You hire them after your b round.
你在 B 轮融资后雇用他们。
And you say, you know what, by the time we raise our c round we want the evaluation to be double what it would have been otherwise.
你说，你知道吗，当我们进行 C 轮融资时，我们希望评估结果是原本的两倍。
You almost certainly get better results than if you hire an investive banker or someone else if it's just someone internal to the company and you end up paying way less money, and take like literally half the dilution.
几乎可以肯定， 你会比雇佣投资银行家或其他人（如果只是公司内部人员）获得更好的结果， 而你最终支付的钱要少得多，而且实际上只获得了一半的稀释。
So, I think this is one of these like, slightly none obvious optimizations that people just failed to make.
所以， 我认为这是其中之一，稍微没有明显的优化， 人们只是未能做出。
Tax structuring, so, this is another thing.
税收结构,所以,这是另一回事。
most, once things are working.
大多数情况下，一旦一切正常。
It would be worth you spending a little bit of time thinking about how you set up the tax structure for the company.
您值得花一点时间考虑如何为公司建立税收结构。
I confess, I don't know a lot about the details here because I just find it personally really boring.
我承认，我对这里的细节了解不多，因为我个人觉得它真的很无聊。
But like somehow if you assign all the IP to like some corporation in Ireland that licenses it back to the U.S. corporation, you end up paying like no tax, no corporate tax.
但不知何故， 如果你将所有知识产权分配给爱尔兰的某家公司， 然后将其授权给美国公司，你最终将无需缴纳税款， 无需缴纳公司税。
But I know you can only do that like relatively early on.
但我知道你只能在相对较早的时候这样做。
And this ends up being a huge issue for companies that don't do it that compete with companies that do do it.
对于不这样做的公司来说，这最终成为一个巨大的问题，因为这些公司与这样做的公司竞争。
You know once they're big, public companies.
你知道，一旦它们成为大型上市公司。
So that's worth doing.
所以这是值得做的。
A lot of people throughout the class have talked about your own psychology as a founder.
班上很多人都谈到了你作为创始人的心理。
Here's what they haven't said.
这是他们没有说的话。
It gets worse, not better.
情况变得更糟，而不是更好。
As the company grows, you continue to oscillate.
随着公司的成长,你继续振荡。
The highs are better but the lows keep getting worse.
高点更好，但低点会变得更糟。
And, you, you really want to think about this early on and just be aware this is going to happen.
而且，你，你真的想尽早考虑这一点，并意识到这将会发生。
And try to try to manage your own psychology through the expanding swings that it's going to go through.
并尝试在即将经历的不断扩大的波动中控制自己的心理。
Another thing that happens as you begin to be successful.
当你开始成功时会发生另一件事。
As you go from being someone that most people rooted for, kind of the underdog, to someone that a lot of people start hating on.
当你从大多数人支持的人，有点失败者，变成很多人开始讨厌的人。
And you know, you see this first in internet commenters who will be, like, I can't believe this **** company raised money.
你知道， 你首先在互联网评论者中看到这一点， 他们会说，我不敢相信这家该死的公司筹集了资金。
It **** sucks, like, awful.
这太糟糕了，太糟糕了。
And it only bothers you a little bit, but then, like, journalists that you kind of care about start writing this, and it just goes on and on.
它只会让你有点困扰，但然后， 就像你关心的记者开始写这篇文章，它就这样一直持续下去。
This also will go on and on as you get more and more successful, and you just have to make peace with this early.
随着你越来越成功， 这种情况也会持续下去，你只需要尽早接受这一点。
But if you don't, it will bother you all the way through.
但如果你不这样做，它会一直困扰你。
This is also a good time to start thinking about how long of a journey this is going to be.
这也是开始考虑这将是一段漫长的旅程的好时机。
Very few founders think long term.
很少有创始人会长远考虑。
Most founders think kind of a year in advance.
大多数创始人都会提前一年思考。
And they think that you know what in three years I'm going to sell my company and either I'm going to become a VC or sit on the beach or something.
他们认为你知道三年后我会卖掉我的公司，要么我成为风险投资人，要么坐在沙滩上什么的。
Because so few people make an actual long term commitment to what they're building, the ones that do have a huge advantage.
因为很少有人对他们正在构建的东西做出真正的长期承诺，所以那些真正做出长期承诺的人拥有巨大的优势。
They're, they're in a very rarefied class, and so this is a good time to like sit around with your cofounders and decide, you know what, we're going to work on this for a very long time.
他们属于一个非常稀有的阶层，所以现在是与你的联合创始人坐在一起并决定的好时机，你知道吗， 我们将在很长一段时间内致力于此。
And we're going to build a strategy that assumes that we're going to be doing this for the next ten years.
我们将制定一项战略，假设我们将在未来十年内这样做。
Just thinking that way alone, I think is probably, a very high leverage thing you can do for success.
我认为，仅仅以这种方式思考可能是您获得成功的一个非常高杠杆的事情。
Take vacation.
休假吧。
Another common thing that we see is founders will run their business for three or four years, without ever taking, you know, more than a day of vacation.
我们看到的另一个常见的事情是创始人会经营他们的企业三四年，你知道， 从来没有超过一天的假期。
And that works for like a year, or two years, or something like that.
这可以持续一年、两年或类似的时间。
It really leads to nasty burnout if you don't do it.
如果你不这样做，真的会导致严重的倦怠。
Losing focus is another way that founders get off track.
失去焦点是创始人偏离轨道的另一种方式。
I actually think this is a symptom of burnout.
我实际上认为这是倦怠的症状。
When you get really burned out on running the business, you want to do easier things, or sort of more gratifying things.
当你对经营企业感到精疲力尽时，你会想做一些更容易的事情， 或者更令人满意的事情。
You want to go to conferences, and have people tell you how great you are.
你想去参加会议，让人们告诉你你有多棒。
You know, you want to do all these things that are not actually building the business.
你知道，你想做所有这些实际上并没有建立业务的事情。
And the most common post-YC failure case for the companies we fund is that they're incredibly focused, during YC, on their company, and then after, they start doing a lot of other things.
对于我们资助的公司来说， YC 后最常见的失败案例是，他们在 YC 期间非常专注于他们的公司， 然后，他们开始做很多其他事情。
You know, they, they advise companies.
你知道，他们为公司提供建议。
They go to conferences, whatever.
他们去参加会议，无论如何。
Focus is what made you successful in the first place.
专注是让你成功的首要因素。
There are a lot of reasons people lose focus, but fight against that really, really hard.
人们注意力不集中的原因有很多，但要努力克服它。
This is a special case of focus.
这是焦点的一个特例。
As you start to do well.
当你开始做得很好时。
You will start to get a bunch of potential acquires sniffing around.
你将开始嗅到一堆潜在的收购机会。
And it's very gratifying.
这是非常令人欣慰的。
And you're like wow, I can be so rich and that'd be so cool.
你会说，哇，我可以变得如此富有，那真是太酷了。
And negotiations feel really fun.
谈判感觉真的很有趣。
This is one the biggest killers of, of companies is that they entertain acquisition conversations.
这是公司最大的*手之一，因为他们乐于进行收购对话。
You, you distract yourself.
你，你分散了自己的注意力。
You get demoralized if it doesn't happen.
你得到士气低落,如果它不会发生。
If an offer does come in and it's really low, you've already like mentally thought that you're done, and so you take the offer.
如果确实有offer， 而且价格非常低，那么你已经在心里认为你已经完成了，所以你接受了offer。
As a general rule, don't start any acquisition conversation unless you're willing to sell for a pretty low number.
一般来说，除非您愿意以相当低的价格出售，否则不要开始任何收购对话。
Don't ever just check it hoping that you're going to have the one miracle high offer.
永远不要只是检查它，希望你会得到一个奇迹般的高报价。
If that's going to happen you'll know.
如果那会发生，你就会知道。
Because they'll just make you a big offer before you can meet them.
因为他们会在你见到他们之前给你一个很大的报价。
But this, this is a big company killer.
但这，这可是大公司*手啊。
And then just as a reminder to everybody the thing that kills startups at some level is the founders giving up.
然后提醒大家，在某种程度上*死初创公司的是创始人的放弃。
So sometimes you should quit.
所以有时候你应该放弃。
But, if you mismanage your own psychology and you quit when, when you shouldn't, that, that is what kills companies.
但是， 如果你对自己的心理管理不善，在不应该辞职的时候辞职， 那就会毁了公司。
I mean that is, that is the sort of final closet death in most of these start ups.
我的意思是，在大多数这些初创公司中，这是最后的壁橱死亡。
And so if you can manage your own psychology in a way that you don't quit.
因此，如果你能以一种不放弃的方式管理自己的心理。
Dont go to place a where you need to quit, or give up on the startup.
不要去一个你需要退出或放弃创业的地方。
You'll be in a far, far better place.
你会在一个好得多的地方。
So, marketing and PR is something that we tell companies to ignore for a long time.
所以，营销和公关是我们长期以来告诉企业要忽视的事情。
Everyone thinks in the early days that the press is going to be what saves them.
在早期，每个人都认为媒体将拯救他们。
We tell them all the time it doesn't work that way.
我们一直告诉他们这样行不通。
It's definitely true.
这绝对是真的。
You know, press is not what's going to save your startup.
要知道,媒体不是拯救你的创业公司的东西。
But as you start to be successful, this is something that the founders themselves need to spend time on.
但当你开始成功时，创始人自己就需要花时间在这上面。
So, once your product is working, switch from not caring about this, to caring about it a little bit.
因此，一旦你的产品开始工作，就从不关心它转变为稍微关心它。
And, the two most important things for the founder to do, the founders to do.
而且，对于创始人来说，创始人要做的最重要的两件事。
Figure out the key messaging yourselves.
自己找出关键消息。
Never outsource this to your head of marketing or PR firm.
切勿将其外包给您的营销主管或公关公司。
You, founders have to figure out what the message of the compay is going to be.
你们，创始人必须弄清楚公司要传达的信息是什么。
And once you set that, it kind of sticks.
一旦你设置了它，它就会粘住。
It's very hard to change this once the press decides how they're going to talk about you.
一旦媒体决定如何谈论你，就很难改变这一点。
The other thing is getting to know key journalists yourself.
另一件事是亲自了解主要记者。
PR firms will always try to prevent you from doing this, because they need to have a reason to exist.
公关公司总是会试图阻止你这样做，因为他们需要有一个存在的理由。
And so they're like, well, we're going to handle the relationship with the journalist.
所以他们说，好吧，我们要处理好与记者的关系。
We'll just bring you in for interviews.
我们只会带你去面试。
No journalist wants to talk to a PR flack, ever.
从来没有记者愿意与公关人士交谈。
They're so much more happy to just hear from a founder.
他们更高兴听到创始人的来信。
I think the biggest PR hack you can do, is to not hire a PR firm.
我认为你能做的最大的公关技巧就是不聘请公关公司。
Just pick three or four journalists that you develop really close relationships with, that like you, that understand you, that you get.
只需选择三到四位与您建立非常密切关系的记者，他们喜欢您， 了解您，您就可以了。
And then you contact them yourself.
然后你自己联系他们。
They will cover every story you ever give them, and they'll actually pay attention, get to know you and care about the company.
他们会报道你给他们的每一个故事，他们实际上会关注、了解你并关心公司。
This is so much better than the normal strategy of having a PR firm blast 200 contacts that never read their e-mails, with every piece of news.
这比让公关公司用每条新闻轰炸 200 个从不读过他们电子邮件的联系人的正常策略要好得多。
so, this is something that I think is important to start doing.
所以，我认为这是开始做的重要事情。
This is also the time in a company when business development starts to matter.
这也是公司业务发展开始重要的时候。
And so, in the early days you can basically ignore anything that would be like doing deals, except maybe fund raising and sales.
因此， 在早期， 你基本上可以忽略任何类似于交易的事情，除了融资和销售。
You know, this is the time when they're important.
你知道，这是他们重要的时候。
And everything, or many things that you do, like even fundraising, falls under the, the category of doing deals.
你所做的一切或许多事情，甚至是筹款，都属于交易的范畴。
So there are, here's my one-minute crash course on this.
这是我的一分钟速成课程。
There are five points that I think are important to understand here.
我认为这里有五点需要理解。
We've talked about this a lot.
我们已经讨论过很多次了。
Nothing will serve, nothing will matter if you don't build a great product.
如果你不打造出出色的产品，那么一切都毫无用处，一切都毫无意义。
So assume that you've done this before you go try and get anyone to do anything with you.
所以假设你已经这样做了，然后你去尝试让任何人对你做任何事情。
Developing a personal connection with anyone you're trying to do any sort of big deal with, is really important.
与任何你想要做任何大事的人建立个人联系是非常重要的。
For whatever reason, most founders fail to do this, or many founders fail to do this.
无论出于何种原因，大多数创始人都未能做到这一点，或者说许多创始人未能做到这一点。
But no one wants to feel like they're this transactional thing, that you're using them to get distribution for your product, or to raise money, or whatever.
但没有人希望感觉它们是一种交易性的东西，你正在使用它们来分销你的产品，或者筹集资金， 或者其他什么。
And, so figuring out some way to actually care about this person and care about what you're doing with them.
所以，想办法真正关心这个人，关心你和他们一起做的事情。
And not view them, you have to in your own mind not just view them as a one off transaction.
而不是查看它们，您必须在自己的头脑中不仅仅将它们视为一次性交易。
You have to actually care about them and what they're going to get out of this.
你必须真正关心他们以及他们将从中得到什么。
Competitive dynamics, so this is like basic principle of negotiation.
竞争动态，所以这就像谈判的基本原则。
Most funders learn this the first time in fundraising but it actually matters for everything.
大多数资助者在筹款过程中第一次了解到这一点，但它实际上对一切都很重要。
The way you get deals done, and the way you get good terms, is to have a competitive situation.
完成交易和获得良好条件的方法就是拥有竞争地位。
You know, if you don't do this deal with party A, you're going to do it with party B. It's not always an option, but it usually is, and this is, like, the single thing that makes deals happen and makes deals move.
你知道， 如果你不与甲方做这笔交易，你就会与乙方做这件事。 这并不总是一个选择，但通常是这样，这就像是促成交易发生的唯一一件事并推动交易。
Tyler talked about persistence the last lecture so I won't hit on that again too much, other than to say, you have to go beyond your comfort point here, most of the time as a founder.
泰勒在上一次演讲中谈到了坚持不懈， 所以我不会再过多地谈论这个问题，只是说， 你必须超越你的舒适点，大多数时候作为创始人。
And then, the fifth point is you have to ask for what you want.
第五点,你要问自己想要什么。
This is another thing, I still have trouble with this, and certainly most of the founders we do.
这是另一回事，我仍然遇到麻烦，当然我们大多数创始人也遇到麻烦。
Have, you know, if you want something to deal, just ask for it.
你知道，如果你想要做点什么，就直接提出要求。
Most of the time, you know, you won't get laughed out of the room and you might get it.
大多数时候，你知道，你不会被嘲笑出房间，你可能会得到它。
But you have to be like, at some point you actually have to say, you know this is what I'd like you to do.
但你必须说， 在某些时候， 你实际上必须说，你知道这是我希望你做的。
Even if it feels aggressive or an overreach, or whatever.
即使它感觉咄咄逼人或过度扩张,或者其他什么。
So I'm going to close, this part of the talk with an image.
所以我要用一张图片来结束这部分的演讲。
One of the Airbnb founders drew this on like a business card or something for another founder that was starting a company.
Airbnb 的一位创始人将其视为另一位正在创办公司的创始人的名片或其他东西。
And then I saw it once and took a picture of it.
然后我看到了一次并拍了一张照片。
Because I thought it was such a good summary.
因为我觉得这是一个很好的总结。
And what he had tried to draw here was the Ycombinator process as he remembered it.
他试图在这里画出他记忆中的 Ycombinator 过程。
And I love it because it's like so simple, and it looks so do-able when it's written on a business card.
我喜欢它， 因为它是如此简单，当它写在名片上时， 它看起来非常可行。
But you're trying to find product market fit.
但是你试图找到产品市场契合度。
You know, you're trying to build a product, and you're trying to close the gap between those two gears.
您知道， 您正在尝试构建产品，并且正在尝试缩小这两个齿轮之间的差距。
The only way to do that is to go off and meet the people.
要做到这一点,唯一的办法就是走出去,与人们见面。
You cannot do this without getting really, really close to your users.
如果不真正、真正地接近你的用户,你就无法做到这一点。
And then he drew this graph that, sort of on a whiteboard at YC and got in kind of, like, one of the YC he writes a passage, but that's the graph of how adoption goes for a new company.
然后他在 YC 的白板上画了这个图表，就像他在 YC 中写的一段话一样，但这就是新公司采用情况的图表。
So you launch in the press, you get a huge spike.
所以你在媒体上发布,你会得到一个巨大的尖峰。
It falls off to nothing.
它会消失得无影无踪。
At some point, at least one point, things look like they're going to completely die and kind of dip below the x-axis.
在某一时刻，至少在某一时刻，事物看起来会完全消亡，并且会下降到 x 轴以下。
They recover a little bit.
他们恢复了一点。
You have this long, long, long trough of sorrow before things work.
在事情发生之前，你会经历一段漫长、漫长、漫长的悲伤低谷。
In Airbnb's case, it was 1,000 days before the graph started ticking upward.
就 Airbnb 而言，1000 天后图表才开始上升。
You have these wiggles of false hope, and then finally, finally, finally, things start to grow.
你有这些虚假的希望，然后最后，最后，最后，事情开始成长。
Three years later.
三年后。
So starting a startup ends up being this very long process.
因此，创业最终是一个非常漫长的过程。
It is, you know, it can be really rewarding.
你知道，这确实是有益的。
It's definitely long, but it is do-able.
这绝对是漫长的,但它是可行的。
And that's what I love about that drawing.
这就是我喜欢那幅画的原因。
So, with that, I think I have about ten minutes left.
那么，我想我还有大约十分钟的时间。
I can answer questions on this, or anything else in the course that we've covered.
我可以回答有关此问题或我们课程中介绍的任何其他问题。
If anyone has some.
如果有人有的话。
Yes.
是的。
>> You have that diversity being important, but an earlier speaker said diversity wasn't important and you should just hire people that are very much like you, and then you can cross.
>> 多样性很重要，但之前的一位发言者说多样性并不重要， 你应该只雇用与你非常相似的人，然后你就可以交叉。
>> So, here is the the question is, how do you you square the device of diversity being important with earlier speakers saying you want people that are very similar.
>> 所以，问题是，你如何将多样性的重要性与早期发言者所说的你想要非常相似的人联系起来。
the, the difference what you want is you want diversity of backgrounds, but you don't want diversity of vision.
你想要的不同之处在于你想要背景的多样性，但你不想要视觉的多样性。
Like where companies get in trouble is when they have people think very differently about what the company should be doing, or don't work well together.
就像公司遇到麻烦时， 人们对公司应该做什么的想法截然不同，或者不能很好地合作。
You don't want that.
你不想要这样。
You do want to hire people that you know, and that you trust and that you can work with.
您确实想雇用您认识的、您信任的、可以共事的人。
But if everyone on the team comes from exactly the same background you end, you do end up developing somewhat of a mono-culture which often causes problems down the road.
但是， 如果团队中的每个人都来自与你完全相同的背景，那么你最终会形成某种单一文化， 这往往会在未来带来问题。
Not always.
不总是。
Some companies have been successful with that.
一些公司在这方面取得了成功。
So what, what we tell people is, hire people that you know and that you've worked with before.
那么，我们告诉人们的是，雇用你认识并且以前共事过的人。
But try to hi, try to hire people that are complementary and align towards the same goal, not people that are exactly the same.
但要试着打招呼， 尝试雇佣互补的、朝着同一目标前进的人，而不是完全相同的人。
because you just get a, a better skill set.
因为你刚刚获得了一套更好的技能。
Yeah.
是的。
>> What are some examples of ways to make a transition back to a more personal level, especially when you're really.
>> 有哪些方法可以帮助您过渡到更加个人化的水平，尤其是当您真的这样做时。
>> >> How to keep track, productivity systems.
>> >> 如何跟踪生产力系统。
So, the one I use, which actually I think works really well, is I keep one piece of paper with my goals for sort of a three to 12 month time frame.
所以， 我使用的方法（实际上我认为效果非常好）是我保留一张纸，上面写着我的目标， 时间范围为 3 到 12 个月。
And I look at that every day.
我每天都会看这个。
And then separately I keep one, one page for every day of my short term goals for that day.
然后我单独保留一页，每一天的短期目标。
And so if I need to do something in like a week, I just flip forward seven pages and write it down, and then I also keep a list of every person and what they're working on, and what I need to tell them, and what I need to talk to them about, what we talked about last time.
因此， 如果我需要在一周内做某件事，我只需翻阅七页并将其写下来，然后我还会保留每个人的清单以及他们正在做什么，以及我需要告诉他们什么， 以及我需要和他们讨论什么，我们上次讨论过什么。
So every time I sit down with someone, I kind of have the full statement, a list of things for that person that works really well.
因此， 每次我与某人坐下来时，我都会得到完整的陈述， 列出对该人来说非常有效的事情。
Yes.
是的。
>> So we talked about that startup growing.
>> 所以我们讨论了该初创公司的成长。
But most startups fail.
但大多数初创公司都失败了。
>> Yeah.
>> 是的。
>> Any advice for kind of fail gracefully.
>> 对于优雅失败的任何建议。
>> Yeah.
>> 是的。
>> >> How to fail gracefully.
>> >> 如何优雅地失败。
So, most startups fail,and Silicon Valley almost goes too far in how much it loves failure.
因此，大多数初创公司都会失败，而硅谷对失败的喜爱程度几乎有些过头了。
Failure still sucks.
失败仍然很糟糕。
You should still try not to fail.
你仍然应该努力不要失败。
And this whole, like, thing, of like, failure's great, I, I don't agree with.
这整个，就像，事情，就像，失败是伟大的，我，我不同意。
But it will happen to most people most of the time, and it's a very forgiving environment.
但这种情况大多数时候都会发生在大多数人身上，而且这是一个非常宽容的环境。
As long as you are upfront about it, and ethical, and don't let anyone get into a bad situation.
只要你坦率地面对此事，并且有道德，并且不要让任何人陷入困境。
So, if you're failing, first of all, you should tell your investors.
因此，如果你失败了，首先，你应该告诉你的投资者。
And, second of all, you should not totally run out of money.
其次,你不应该完全没钱。
What you don't want is a blow-up with a bunch of, you know, debts that the company owe, and everyone, you know, showing up to work, one day, and the door being locked.
你不想要的是公司欠下一大堆债务，而每个人都去上班，有一天，门被锁上了。
You'll know when you're failing, you'll know when the company is, things just aren't going to work, and you should just tell your investors.
当你失败时， 你会知道，当公司失败时，你会知道事情不会成功， 你应该告诉你的投资者。
Like, hey, sorry, this isn't going to work.
就像，嘿，抱歉，这行不通。
No one will be surprised.
没有人会感到惊讶。
Like, I expect to lose my, or I'm willing to lose my money on every investment I ever make.
就像，我预计会损失我的钱，或者我愿意在我所做的每一项投资中损失我的钱。
I know that happens most of the time, and the winners pay for it, you know, still with a factor of 100, so it's okay.
我知道这种情况大多数时候都会发生，获胜者为此付出了代价， 你知道，仍然是 100 倍， 所以没关系。
No one, people will be very understanding and supportive.
没有人，人们都会非常理解和支持。
But you want to tell people early.
但你想尽早告诉人们。
You don't want to surprise them.
你不想让他们感到惊讶。
And you want, you don't want to like let your employees gets shocked when they learn they don't have a job.
而且你想要，你不想让你的员工在得知他们没有工作时感到震惊。
you know, you, you, you want to shut the company down in a graceful way.
你知道，你你你想以一种优雅的方式关闭公司。
Help them find jobs.
帮助他们找到工作。
Make sure you give them two or four weeks of severance payment, so that they're not suffering a cash flow problem.
确保给他们两到四个星期的遣散费，这样他们就不会遇到现金流问题。
All that stuff is pretty important.
所有这些东西都非常重要。
Yes.
是的。
>> How many immigrant founders have you seen in Y Combinator?
>> 你在Y Combinator见过多少位移民创始人？
>> How many immigrant founders have we seen in Y Combinator?
>> 我们在 Y Combinator 看到过多少移民创始人?
In the last batch, I think it probably went up for this next batch, in the last batch 41% of the founders we funded were born outside the US.
在上一批中， 我认为下一批可能会上涨， 在上一批中，我们资助的创始人中有 41% 出生在美国境外。
From 30 different countries.
来自 30 个不同的国家。
So it's.
所以就是。
Yeah a pretty big percentage.
是的，比例相当大。
>> What do you think are other good places to start a start up?
>> 您认为还有哪些其他适合创业的好地方？
>> Apart from the Valley where do I think are other good places to start a start up?
>> 除了硅谷之外，我认为还有哪些其他适合创业的好地方？
Well I still think the Valley is the best by a very significant margin.
嗯，我仍然认为硅谷是最好的，并且遥遥领先。
But I think it's finally, maybe beginning to weaken a little bit.
但我认为它最终可能开始减弱一点。
Because the costs have just gotten so out of control.
因为成本已经变得如此失控。
To be clear, if I was going to start a company I still wouldn't think about.
需要明确的是，如果我要创办一家公司，我仍然不会考虑。
I would still pick Silicon Valley.
我还是会选择硅谷。
And I think if you look at the data of companies over the last few years, Valley still wins by a lot.
我认为， 如果你看看过去几年公司的数据，硅谷仍然领先很多。
But Seattle, LA, lots of places outside the U.S., I think all of these make sense.
但是西雅图，洛杉矶，美国以外的很多地方，我认为所有这些都是有道理的。
>> Like what places outside?
>> 喜欢外面什么地方？
I hesitate to make recommendations there because I haven't spent enough time in this cities to really have an intuitive feel.
我犹豫是否要在那里提出建议，因为我还没有在这个城市花足够的时间来真正有直观的感受。
but, like, I mean, you, you know as well as I do the common ones people talk about, startup hubs, and I just, I can't make a personal recommendation there.
但是， 我的意思是， 你和我一样了解人们谈论的常见的创业中心，但我无法在那里提出个人推荐。
>> Hire a professional CEO or like a senior.
>> 聘请一位专业的 CEO 或高级管理人员。
>> When should the founders think about hiring a professional CEO?
>> 创始人何时应该考虑聘请专业首席执行官？
Never.
绝不。
you, if you look at the most successful.
你，如果你看看最成功的。
Companies in tech, they are run by their founders for a very long time, sometimes forever.
科技公司由创始人经营很长一段时间，有时甚至是永远。
And sometimes they even hire a professional CEO and then realize that that is not going to like build a great company.
有时他们甚至聘请了一位专业的首席执行官，然后意识到这不会像建立一家伟大的公司那样。
And so, like Larry Page came back to CEO again.
就这样，拉里·佩奇再次回到了首席执行官的位置。
I think, if you don't want to be the long-term CEO of a company, you probably shouldn't start one.
我认为，如果你不想长期担任一家公司的首席执行官，你可能就不应该创办一家公司。
I'm not totally sure about that.
我对此不太确定。
I think there are exceptions.
我认为也有例外。
But generally, that, the transition I talked about today, if you go from building a great product to building a great company.
但总的来说， 我今天谈到的转变，如果你从打造一个伟大的产品到打造一个伟大的公司。
Being a founder, you know, for nine of the ten years is going to be about building that great company.
你知道，作为一名创始人，十年中有九年的时间都是为了建立一家伟大的公司。
And if you're, if you're not excited about doing that I think you should think hard about, about it.
如果你对这样做不感兴趣，我认为你应该认真考虑一下。
Yes?
是吗?
>> What are some of the most common and most alarming warning signs you should be looking for.
>> 您应该寻找哪些最常见和最令人震惊的警告信号。
When you're trying to make this shift from building great products to building great companies.
当你试图从打造伟大的产品转向打造伟大的公司时。
What are the, the most common mistakes to make when you're shifting towards building your own company?
当您转向建立自己的公司时，最常犯的错误是什么？
I think I went through most of them here.
我想我在这里经历了其中的大部分。
I tried to put everything in here that I see people mess up most of the time.
我试着把我看到人们大部分时间都搞砸的东西放在这里。
Yes?
是的？
>> Is there a way to get involved in the Y com, community before getting accepted?
>> 有没有办法在被录取之前参与 Y com 社区？
Is there a way to get involved with YC before getting funded?
有没有一种方法可以在获得资金之前参与YC?
No, and intentionally not.
不，而且是故意不这样做。
Actually I'll say the one thing you can do is if you work at a YC company.
实际上我会说你能做的一件事就是如果你在 YC 公司工作。
And then later apply I think that probably like, well not probably.
然后稍后申请，我认为可能会喜欢，但也可能不会。
That definitely if you get a good recommendation from those founders will help with YC.
如果你从这些创始人那里得到一个好的推荐，那肯定会对 YC 有所帮助。
So you know, working at a YC company helps.
所以你知道，在 YC 公司工作很有帮助。
But there's not much you can do to help and that's intentional.
但你无能为力，这是故意的。
Like there is no pre start up in a way that there's pre-med.
就像没有医学预科那样，没有预科启动。
You should just focus on whatever you're doing.
你应该专注于你正在做的事情。
And when you start a start up, there's things like YC and others that are structured to help you.
当你开始创业时，有像 YC 这样的东西可以帮助你。
Most of the founders we fund, we don't know at all before we do it.
我们资助的大多数创始人,在我们这样做之前,我们根本不知道。
You know, you don't, you really don't need to get to know us or get involved.
你知道，你不需要，你真的不需要了解我们或参与其中。
We're, we're all good that way.
我们，我们都这样就好了。
Yes?
是的？
>> There's a statistic of saying, now harder to get into Y company then getting, getting into Harvard.
>> 有一种说法是，现在进入 Y 公司比进入哈佛更难。
So I'm curious, the criteria that are used, think of start-up, does it change over time, or?
所以我很好奇，所使用的标准，想想初创企业，它会随着时间的推移而改变吗？
>> The question is what, what criteria do we use to pick start-ups and has it gotten harder?
>> 问题是，我们用什么标准来挑选初创企业？它变得更难了吗？
Has it changed?
它改变了吗？
You know, we, the two things that we need to see are, are good founders and a good idea.
你知道，我们需要看到的两件事是，好的创始人和好主意。
And without both of those, we, we won't fund a company.
如果没有这两者，我们就不会资助一家公司。
But that hasn't changed.
但这并没有改变。
That has, that has always been the case.
一直都是这样，一直都是这样。
The applicant pool to YC has grown quite a bit.
YC 的申请者数量已经增长了不少。
But most of, or a lot of the growth is, you know, people that shouldn't be starting start-ups anyway.
但你知道，大部分增长的人无论如何都不应该创办初创企业。
Probably, that are just doing it because it's sort of the cool thing now.
也许，他们这样做只是因为现在这很酷。
So you know, if you're really passionate about an idea.
所以你知道，如果你真的对一个想法充满热情。
And the idea is good.
这个主意很好。
And you're you know, smart and get things done that you're executing.
你知道，你很聪明，能把你正在执行的事情做好。
I still think you have a, a very reasonable shot at YC, even though the headline number is bigger.
我仍然认为你在 YC 上有一个非常合理的机会，尽管标题数字更大。
Yes.
是的。
>> The certain, certain market that you're really excited about but don't necessarily know a lot about yet.
>> 您真正感兴趣但不一定了解很多的特定市场。
Is there a certain or ways to ,.
有没有一定的或方法，.
>> Sure.
>> 当然。
If there's a market that you're excited about but don't know a lot about yet, what should you do?
如果有一个您感兴趣但还不太了解的市场，您应该怎么做？
Two schools of thought on this.
对此有两种思想流派。
One is to just jump right in.
一是直接跳进去。
Learn it as you go.
学习它,当你去。
That's worked a lot of times.
这已经工作了很多次了。
The other is to go work at a company in the space or do something in, in the market for, you know, a year or two years.
另一种是在该领域的公司工作或在市场上做一些事情，你知道，一年或两年。
I lean slightly towards the second.
我稍微倾向于第二个。
But as long as you're willing to really learn and really study and really get uncomfortably close to your users, either case will work.
但只要你愿意真正学习、真正研究、真正与用户保持不舒服的亲密关系，任何一种情况都可以。
And I don't think it's that much of a disadvantage.
而且我认为这并不是什么太大的缺点。
I, I think, all things being equal, I would go spend a couple years learning about it in detail, but I don't think you have to.
我，我认为，在所有条件相同的情况下， 我会花几年时间详细了解它，但我认为你不必这样做。
Yes?
是的？
>> I have question related to YC to.
>> 我有与 YC 相关的问题。
>> Sure.
>> 当然。
>> Yeah so, I think that YC does fantastic job in promoting partnership, instead of combating.
>>是的，我认为 YC 在促进伙伴关系而不是对抗方面做得非常出色。
In fact, as an institutional investor I actually I messed with a suite up at YC.
事实上，作为一名机构投资者，我在 YC 搞砸了一套套房。
In past periods, the hardware has things like you know, you guys has 180 companies every year jumping into the market.
在过去的时期， 硬件领域就像你们知道的那样，每年有 180 家公司进入市场。
And it looks like it's hard to follow each of the YC companies any more.
看起来很难再追踪每家 YC 公司了。
Do you think that this will create some you know, if some people will walk away from YC.
如果有些人会离开 YC，你认为这会创造一些你认识的人吗？
Because they cannot follow such a companies.
因为他们无法跟随这样的公司。
The company has to be very polished and the founder has to be thinking over and over about ideas.
公司必须非常完善，创始人必须反复思考想法。
Easy to access the capital- >> All right, so I think the question is do I think investors are going to fund less YC companies as we grow?
容易获得资金- >> 好吧，所以我认为问题是， 随着我们的成长， 投资者是否会为 YC 公司提供更少的资金？
no.
不。
Definitely not.
绝对不是。
Like certainly the trend in this is the other way.
当然，这方面的趋势是相反的。
We have more and more investors saying that, you know, half their portfolio's now YC companies.
越来越多的投资者表示，他们的投资组合现在有一半是 YC 公司。
And they're looking forward to the day where it's three-quarters.
他们期待着四分之三的那一天。
No I don't think that's a problem at all.
不，我认为这根本不是问题。
I think that is like so not on my top 100 problem list.
我认为这不在我的前100个问题列表中。
The opposite of that maybe.
也许恰恰相反。
All right, one more question.
好吧，还有一个问题。
Yes.
是的。
>> When should a group of founders raise a seed fund or the first fund?
>> 一群创始人应该何时筹集种子基金或第一支基金？
>> When should a group of founders raise some seed money?
>> 一群创始人什么时候应该筹集一些种子资金?
This is a great question.
这是一个很好的问题。
I think that, I think that in general.
我认为，总的来说，我认为是这样。
It's nice to wait until you have the idea figured out and initial signs of promise before you raise money.
最好等到你想出主意并初步看到承诺的迹象后再筹集资金。
Raising money puts some pressure on the company.
筹集资金给公司带来了一些压力。
Some time pressure.
有些时间压力。
And once you've raised money you can't be in this exploratory phase indefinitely.
一旦你筹集到资金，你就不能无限期地处于这个探索阶段。
you, and you end up having to rush.
你，最终不得不匆忙。
And so, like, if you haven't raised money, and your idea's not working, you can, you know, like flail around and pivot until you really hit on the thing that's working.
所以，如果你还没有筹集到资金，并且你的想法不起作用，你知道，你可以四处寻找并转向， 直到你真正找到可行的方法。
But if you raise money and your idea doesn't work, you're in this like oh **** moment, and you have to pivot.
但如果你筹集了资金， 而你的想法行不通，那么你就处于这个糟糕的时刻，你必须转变方向。
And you pivot to whatever the first vaguely plausible idea is.
然后你就会转向第一个模糊可信的想法。
And that's bad.
这很糟糕。
So I think.
所以我认为。
If you can wait to raise any outside capital more than say, like $100 or $200,000 if you're necessary, but ideally not even that.
如果你可以等待筹集更多的外部资金，比如 100 美元或 200,000 美元（如果有必要的话），但理想情况下甚至不是这个。
Until things are working or, or at least pointing in the direction of working you're way better off.
直到事情开始发挥作用，或者至少指明了工作的方向，你的境况就会好得多。
All right, thank you all very much, this was fun.
好的，非常感谢大家，这很有趣。
