Two Years After Russia Invaded Ukraine: Q&A with RAND Experts Q&A
本周是俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰两周年。持续的冲突使人们重新关注俄罗斯复仇主义构成的地区威胁，并对该地区和其他地方的安全与稳定提出挑战。地缘政治影响是巨大的。这场冲突为现代战争树立了新的基准，并再次证明了世界的危险性。
美国著名智库兰德公司的专家受邀讨论了冲突的现状及其前景、全球影响、可能的结果和解决方案，以及西方和世界其他地区现在和一旦敌对行动结束可能会做什么。
This week marks the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The ongoing conflict has brought renewed focus on the regional threat posed by Russian revanchism and presents challenges to security and stability both in the region and elsewhere. The geopolitical implications are immense. The conflict has established new benchmarks in the ways of modern warfare and demonstrated anew just how dangerous the world is.
We invited a group of RAND experts to discuss the state of the conflict and its prospects, its global implications, possible outcomes and solutions, and what the West and the rest of the world might be doing now and once hostilities end.
How has the situation changed in the last year? 去年的情况发生了怎样的变化？威廉·考特尼：2023年，在地面战争中，双方在乌克兰东部和南部发动了失败的攻势，使地面战争陷入僵局。在海上战争中，乌克兰的创新无人机和反舰导弹击沉了俄罗斯黑海舰队的军舰；莫斯科将剩余的一些船只转移到黑海东部，乌克兰恢复了经由土耳其海峡的粮食和其他商船运输。在空战中，乌克兰的防御系统击落了越来越多的俄罗斯导弹和无人机。美国提供的爱国者防空系统拦截弹甚至击落了“匕首”高超音速导弹，普京曾声称这些导弹无懈可击。
WILLIAM COURTNEY In 2023 in the ground war, both sides carried out failed offensives in eastern and southern Ukraine, leaving a stalemate on the ground. In the naval war, Ukraine's innovative drones and anti-ship missiles sank warships from Russia's Black Sea Fleet; Moscow relocated some remaining ships to the eastern Black Sea, helping to clear the way for Ukraine to resume grain and other merchant shipping via the Turkish straits. In the air war, Ukraine's defenses shot down growing numbers of Russian missiles and drones. U.S.-supplied Patriot interceptors even downed Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, which Putin had claimed were invulnerable.
拉斐尔·科恩：与去年相比，乌克兰面临两个挑战。在军事上，即使不是纯粹的大批力量倾斜，战线也基本上停滞不前，这在一定程度上对俄罗斯有利。在政治上，西方——尤其是美国——一直在努力提供乌克兰维持战斗所需的军事援助。如果没有更多的西方军事援助，乌克兰就无法扭转军事势头，但乌克兰将难以获得更多的军事援助，除非它能够向怀疑论者——尤其是美国——证明它能够在战场上获胜。
RAPHAEL COHEN Compared with last year, Ukraine faces two challenges. Militarily, the lines have largely stagnated, if not tilted by sheer force of mass, somewhat in Russia's favor. Politically, the West—and particularly the United States—has struggled to provide the military aid Ukraine needs to sustain the fight. Ukraine can't turn the military tide without more Western military aid, but Ukraine will struggle to get more military aid, unless it can demonstrate to skeptics—particularly in the United States—that it can win on the battlefield.
安·戴利：西方政治*终于意识到这将是一场漫长的战争。这一认识的后续影响因一个国家支持乌克兰的立场而异。爱沙尼亚和英国等国一直在努力投资国防工业基地生产，并提供长期资金，以向俄罗斯发出信号，表明他们不能指望通过超越基辅的合作伙伴而获胜。今年将是决定性的一年，不仅因为战场上发生的事情，还因为包括美国在内的64个国家将参加投票。
ANN DAILEY Western political leaders have finally realized this will be a long war. Follow-on effects from this realization vary depending on where a country stands in its support for Ukraine. Countries like Estonia and the United Kingdom have endeavored to invest in defense industrial base production and provide long-term funding to signal to Russia that they cannot hope to win by out-waiting Kyiv's partners. This year will be decisive not just because of what happens on the battlefield, but because 64 countries—including the United States—will go to the polls.
詹姆斯·布莱克：在2022年领土控制发生戏剧性波动后，战争在2023年陷入了一场阵地战和消耗战。随着俄罗斯数十万人的损失不断增加，大量装备被摧毁，随后俄罗斯经济被动员到战争状态以取代库存，乌克兰武装部队的勇气早已粉碎了俄罗斯社会可以免受普京“特别军事行动”可怕代价影响的幻想。
JAMES BLACK After the dramatic swings in territorial control during 2022, the war settled into a positional and attritional grind in 2023. Along with mounting Russian losses in the hundreds of thousands, and the destruction of huge swathes of equipment and consequent mobilization of Russia's economy onto a war footing to replace stocks, the grit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has long since shattered any illusion that Russian society could be insulated from the dire costs of Putin's “special military operation.”
玛尔塔 KEPE：在过去的一年里，这场战争已经演变成一场残酷的消耗战。双方都经历了各种问题，从后勤和维持到对方几乎不可避免的监视。
MARTA KEPE Over the last year the war has turned into a grinding war of attrition. Both sides have experienced various problems from logistics and sustainment to almost inescapable surveillance by the other side.
西方继续对乌克兰提供援助对乌克兰的军事努力很重要，但有关乌克兰未来的政治和军事决定将由乌克兰*做出。
Continuation of Western aid to Ukraine will be important for Ukraine's military effort, but the political and military decisions about the future of Ukraine will be made by Ukrainian leaders.
Where do you think the conflict will be one year from now? 你认为一年后冲突会发生在哪里？科恩坦率地说，这将在一定程度上取决于美国的选举以及美国对乌克兰的援助是否继续提供。这场战争只能在乌克兰获胜，但在华盛顿特区可能会失败。
COHEN To be blunt, it's going to depend a little on the U.S. elections and whether American aid to Ukraine keeps flowing. This war can only be won in Ukraine, but it can be lost here in Washington, D.C.
彼得·威尔逊：尽管我对俄罗斯军队的复原力说错了，但俄罗斯军队有可能在2024年夏天崩溃。另一方面，如果美国的主要军事援助因国会持续瘫痪而枯竭，乌克兰可能会陷入军事困境。
PETER WILSON Although I have been wrong about the resilience of the Russian Army, it is possible that the Russian Army may collapse during the summer of 2024. On the other hand, Ukraine may be in military dire straits if major American military assistance dries up due to ongoing Congressional paralysis.
布莱克：激烈的阵地战的开始，以及双方需要补充在过去12个月的各种反攻中损失的人员和物资，表明2024年可能是巩固、消耗性交换的一年，并为2024年末或2025年的新进攻行动做准备。
BLACK The onset of grinding positional warfare and the need for both sides to replenish men and materiel lost in the various counteroffensives of the last 12 months suggest that 2024 could be a year of consolidation, attritional exchanges, and preparation for renewed offensive action in late 2024 or perhaps 2025.
KEPE: 在接下来的几个月和一年里，我将密切关注乌克兰正在准备的政治和军事领导层变革。西方继续对乌克兰提供援助对乌克兰的军事努力很重要，但有关乌克兰未来的政治和军事决定将由乌克兰*做出。
KEPE Over the next few months and year I will be looking closely at the political and military leadership changes that Ukraine is gearing up for. Continuation of Western aid to Ukraine will be important for Ukraine's military effort, but the political and military decisions about the future of Ukraine will be made by Ukrainian leaders.
How has the U.S. strategy changed over the last year? 美国的战略在过去一年中发生了怎样的变化？科恩：据新闻报道，美国一直在敦促乌克兰采取更具防御性的姿态。这可能在一定程度上是为了节省资源，因为进攻行动通常比防御行动更需要设备和弹药。现在，援助的未来是不确定的。
COHEN According to press reports, the United States has been pushing Ukraine to take a more defensive posture. That's probably in part to conserve resources, since offensive operations generally are more equipment- and munitions-intensive than defensive ones. And right now, the future of aid is uncertain.
戴利：到目前为止，美国的战略一直是“尽可能长时间地”支持乌克兰。不幸的是，这并不包括胜利理论，考虑到美国国内政治的变幻莫测，这也不是一个可行的构想。
DAILEY Until now, the U.S. strategy has been to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes.” Unfortunately, this does not include a theory of victory, nor is it a viable construct given U.S. domestic political vagaries.
威尔逊：在乌克兰进攻失败后，美国似乎对乌克兰对克里米亚和俄罗斯本土的高价值俄罗斯目标的横向升级更加宽容。美国、英国和法国目前正在提供各种打击弹药。
WILSON After the failed Ukrainian offensive, the United States appears to be more tolerant of Ukrainian horizontal escalation against high-value Russian targets in Crimea and Russia proper. A wide range of strike munitions are now being provided by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
What is driving Russia's strategy two years into the conflict? 是什么推动了俄罗斯在冲突两年后的战略？布莱恩·弗雷德里克：自2022年秋天以来，俄罗斯一直寄希望于一项能够比乌克兰及其西方支持者更持久的战略。它已经转向战时经济，优先生产弹药，确保了包括朝鲜和伊朗在内的重要外部军备来源，并在乌克兰领土上建立了难以逾越的强大防御阵地。
BRYAN FREDERICK As it has since the fall of 2022, Russia continues to bank on a strategy that it can outlast Ukraine and its Western supporters. It has shifted to a wartime economy prioritizing the production of munitions, secured important external sources for armaments including from North Korea and Iran, and created formidable defensive positions on Ukrainian territory that will be difficult to overrun.
威尔逊：普京的胜利理论认为，美国和欧洲可能会在政治上破坏稳定，削弱对乌克兰的军事支持。在前线，领导俄罗斯战争的俄罗斯的瓦列里·格拉西莫夫的战略类似于南北战争中的尤利西斯·s·格兰特将军在荒野之战中、英国陆军元帅道格拉斯·黑格在第一次世界大战中在西线以及威廉·威斯莫兰将军在越南的战略：一种持续消耗的战略，以“打破”对手的抵抗意志。这一战略已经摧毁了一支俄罗斯军队，并正在摧毁第二支军队。
WILSON Putin's theory of victory is that the United States and Europe can be politically destabilized and cripple military support to Ukraine. On the battlefront, the strategy of Russia's Valery Gerasimov, who heads the Russian war effort, is similar to Civil War General Ulysses S. Grant in the Battle of the Wilderness, British Field Marshall Douglas Haig at the Western Front in World War I, and General William Westmorland in Vietnam: a strategy of sustained attrition to “break” the opponent's will to resist. This strategy has already destroyed one Russian Army and is in the process of destroying a second.
Has the threat of a Russian nuclear escalation increased or decreased in the last year? 去年，俄罗斯核升级的威胁是增加了还是减少了？弗雷德里克：在战争的第一年半里，对俄罗斯核升级的担忧源于乌克兰获胜和俄罗斯失败可能带来的风险。也就是说，俄罗斯可能会使用核武器来避免失败。在2023年夏天乌克兰反攻失败，以及那年秋天晚些时候出现的美国可能减少对乌克兰援助的可能性之后，这些升级担忧可能已经减少。
FREDERICK For the first year and a half of the war, concerns about Russian nuclear escalation were rooted in the risks that might accompany Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat. That is, that Russia might use nuclear weapons to try to avert defeat. Following the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 and the possibility that emerged later that fall that the United States might curtail its assistance to Ukraine, those escalation concerns have likely declined.
威尔逊：由于乌克兰进攻的失败，俄罗斯核升级的威胁大大减少。如果俄罗斯军队今年夏天开始瓦解，这种威胁可能会再次出现。
WILSON The threat of Russian nuclear escalation has decreased significantly due to the failure of the Ukraine offense. That threat may reemerge if the Russian Army starts to disintegrate this summer.
How much more assistance can Ukraine expect from the United States and the West? 乌克兰还能指望美国和西方提供多少援助？考特尼：去年，一些观察人士预测捐赠者的疲劳感会加剧，但这一点并不明显。国会中似乎存在两党对继续援助的支持。如果国会就边境安全计划达成一致，对乌克兰、以色列和印太地区的援助可能会得到参众两院的大力支持。
COURTNEY Last year some observers predicted rising donor fatigue, but this was not evident. Bipartisan support appears to exist in the Congress for continued aid. If Congress agrees on a border security plan, aid for Ukraine, Israel, and the Indo-Pacific are likely to receive strong support in both the House and Senate.
戴利：你可以从上一次拉姆斯坦小组中看到，即使没有美国的捐款，对乌克兰的支持仍然很强烈。该小组不仅包括美国和“西方”，还包括来自全球各地的参与者。这可能是因为许多国家觉得有必要在他们希望或预计的美国对乌克兰援助短暂暂停期间加大支持力度。
DAILEY You can see from the last Rammstein Group, which includes not just the United States and the “West” but also participants from across the globe, that even without U.S. donations, support for Ukraine remains strong. This likely is because many countries feel the need to step up during what they hope or anticipate would be a short pause in U.S. aid to Ukraine.
布莱克：需要强调的是，西方的支持虽然对某些军事储备造成了巨大消耗，并给一个在30多年的低投资后竞相恢复的国防工业基地带来了巨大压力，但就美国和北约的国防总预算或GDP总和而言，仍然只是一小部分。
BLACK It is important to stress that Western support, while a significant drain on certain military stockpiles and a source of considerable pressure for a defense industrial base racing to recover after over 30 years of low investment, is still only a tiny fraction in terms of either total defense budgets or combined GDP across the United States and NATO.
What would the war look like if the United States were to suspend aid? 如果美国暂停援助，战争会是什么样子？科恩：简单地说，乌克兰可能会输掉这场战争。俄罗斯可能会赢，这是一场血腥但最终成功的战役。美国在世界各地的对手将更加大胆。在一个越来越没有犯错余地的地缘政治环境中，美国将再次犯下大规模非受迫性战略错误。
COHEN Simply put, Ukraine could lose the war. Russia could win, a bloody but ultimately successful campaign. American adversaries around the world would be emboldened. And the United States would have—yet another—massive unforced strategic blunder in a geopolitical environment that increasingly has little margin for error.
弗雷德里克：现任政府不太可能完全停止美国对乌克兰的援助。然而，如果美国国会不授权任何额外援助，这将大大减少美国可以向乌克兰提供的资源，这反过来又将阻碍乌克兰自卫的努力。如果不为美国的援助提供进一步的资金，未来一年乌克兰战场逆转的风险将大大增加。
FREDERICK A complete suspension of U.S. aid to Ukraine under the current administration is unlikely. However, if the U.S. Congress does not authorize any additional assistance, this will sharply curtail the resources that the United States can provide to Ukraine, which in turn will impede Ukraine's efforts to defend itself. Should further funding for U.S. assistance not be provided, the risks of Ukrainian battlefield reversals in the coming year will be greatly increased.
霍林思卡：当乌克兰人在执行任务时无法自卫或提供火力支援时，西方无法履行其对所提供武器类型或数量的承诺或限制，这将立即在战场上感受到。这也会影响士兵和社会的士气。
KHRYSTYNA HOLYNSKA The inability of the West to live up to its promises or restrictions on the types or number of provided weapons would be immediately felt on the battlefield when Ukrainians are not able to defend themselves or provide fire support during missions. It would also affect the morale of the soldiers and the society.
布莱克：美国暂停对乌克兰的援助将是俄罗斯的巨大胜利，对C的刺激，对乌克兰的潜在致命打击，对北约联盟的信誉和凝聚力的巨大冲击，更不用说让人们质疑美国在世界眼中的所谓领导力和民主价值观了。
BLACK A suspension of U.S. aid to Ukraine would be a huge victory for Russia, a fillip to C, a potentially fatal blow to Ukraine, and a seismic shock to the credibility and cohesion of the NATO alliance, not to mention calling into question the supposed leadership and democratic values of the United States in the eyes of the world.
科恩：如果你看看美国2018年和2022年的《国防战略》等文件，它们在很大程度上是以这样一种观点为前提的，即美国可能有五个被点名的对手（、俄罗斯、伊朗、朝鲜和恐怖主义），但一次只需要在全球一个地区与一个对手打一场战争。这根本不是我们现在生活的世界。美国的对手越来越相互关联，美国的防御战略需要迎头赶上。
COHEN If you look at documents like the 2018 and then the 2022 National Defense Strategy, they are largely premised around the idea that the United States may have five named adversaries (, Russia, Iran, DPRK, and terrorism) but will only need to fight one war against one adversary in one part of the globe at a time. That is simply not the world we live in right now. U.S. adversaries are growing increasingly interconnected and U.S. defense strategy needs to catch up.
考特尼：没有向俄罗斯输送大量（如果有的话）致命武器。一些电子产品和其他技术可能正在流动。的金融体系与美国和欧洲金融机构的关系息息相关，似乎没有违反西方的制裁。
Sanctions have been growing steadily. Are they working? 制裁一直在稳步增加。它们在起作用吗？霍华德•沙兹：制裁正在产生效果，但肯定没有希望的那么大。俄罗斯正在大幅增加战争开支，2023年的联邦预算赤字达到有史以来的第三高水平。制裁还迫使俄罗斯企业将业务转移到东方，特别是&，成本高昂，并使俄罗斯在商品、金融和国际支持方面更加依赖&。在考虑制裁的有效性时，必须问另一个问题：如果没有制裁，俄罗斯会做得怎么样？制裁可能漏洞百出，俄罗斯可能已经找到了解决办法，但一个未经批准的俄罗斯肯定会比现在更好。
HOWARD SHATZ Sanctions are having an effect, but certainly not as big as hoped. Russia is undertaking an enormous rise in spending to pay for its war, with the federal budget deficit in 2023 the third-highest level ever. The sanctions have also forced Russian businesses to undergo costly redirections of their business to the East, particularly to &, and have made Russia far more dependent on & for goods, finance, and international support. In considering the effectiveness of sanctions, one other question must be asked: How well would Russia be doing if there were no sanctions? The sanctions may be leaky and Russia may have found workarounds, but an unsanctioned Russia would certainly be better off than it is now.
Did F-16s ever arrive, and are they making any difference? F-16战斗机已经到达过吗？它们有什么不同吗？威尔逊：F-16可能被证明是一个非常有效的空对地对峙导弹对地攻击巡航导弹的发射平台。这将为“绿色”飞行员在不飞往俄罗斯防空系统的情况下提供作战经验。F-16将提高战略防空能力。要求更高的是使用更靠近防御严密的前线的F-16战斗机提供直接的空中支援。
WILSON The F-16s could prove to be a very effective launch platform of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile land attack cruise missile. This will provide “green” pilots combat experience while not flying to Russian air defenses. F-16s will provide an improved strategic air defense capability. More demanding is the use of F-16s nearer to the heavily defended battlefront to provide direct air support.
Putin has made some noises about negotiations; are these for real? Or a ploy? How might the West think about these? 普京对谈判发出了一些声音；这些是真的吗？还是一种策略？西方会如何看待这些问题？考特尼：随着俄罗斯加强战争经济，向前线派遣更多的军队和武器，克里姆林宫似乎致力于继续发动残酷的战争，并寻求控制更多的乌克兰领土。到目前为止，克里姆林宫暗示有兴趣进行谈判，似乎是为了减轻战斗压力，以便俄罗斯能够缓解前线部队的压力，这些部队似乎士气低落，伤亡惨重，并能够重建部队以备未来作战。
COURTNEY As Russia ramps up its war economy and sends more troops and arms to the front, the Kremlin seems committed to continuing to wage its brutal war and seek to control more Ukrainian territory. Thus far, Kremlin hints of interest in negotiations seem aimed at reducing combat pressure so that Russia can relieve frontline troops, who appear to be suffering from low morale and high casualties, and can rebuild units for future fighting.
普里贝：很难知道这些报道有多严肃，但值得跟进了解。一些评论人士认为，对谈判持开放态度将表明俄罗斯意志薄弱，并鼓励俄罗斯继续战斗。目前尚不清楚这是否属实。此外，乌克兰和俄罗斯将不得不在某个时候进行谈判，以结束战争。这是一个可能需要很长时间的过程，因此尽早开始是有意义的。
PRIEBE It is hard to know how serious these reports are, but it is worth following up to find out. Some commentators argue that showing an openness to negotiations would signal weak will and encourage Russia to keep fighting. It is not clear that this is true. Moreover, Ukraine and Russia will have to talk at some point to bring the war to an end. This is a process that might take a long time, so it makes sense to start sooner rather than later.
Is regime change in Russia a possibility? 俄罗斯政权更迭有可能吗？考特尼：俄罗斯的政权变化是不可预测的。目前还没有明显的大规模、有组织的政权更迭政治力量，但理论上可能会出现多种情况。一场伤亡惨重、经济紧张、士气低落的陷入僵局的战争可能会给建立一个更自由的政权带来压力。然而，在另一种情况下，普京和他的前克格勃同僚可能面临民众*乱，并被归咎于一场失败的战争。另一个极端民族主义、压制性的领导层可能会上台。
COURTNEY Regime change in Russia is unpredictable. No large-scale, organized political force for regime change is yet apparent, but in theory multiple scenarios might be possible. A stalemated war with high casualties plus economic strain and low morale could lead to pressures for a more liberal regime. In another scenario, however, Putin and his ex-KGB cohort could face popular unrest and be blamed for a failed war. Another ultra-nationalist, repressive leadership could come to power.
普里贝：目前尚不清楚新*何时上台，也不清楚这一变化将如何影响俄罗斯的外交政策。因此，美国不应将其战时政策建立在希望普京被一位结束乌克兰战争的*取代的基础上。乌克兰的长期战争不符合美国的利益，因此美国不应该计划等待普京下台。相反，鉴于俄罗斯目前的领导地位，美国应该考虑如何更有可能结束战争。
PRIEBE It is unclear when a new leader will come to power or how such a change would affect Russia's foreign policy. Therefore, the United States should not base its wartime policy on the hope that Putin will be replaced with a leader that will end the war in Ukraine. A long war in Ukraine is not in the U.S. interest, so the United States should not plan on waiting Putin out. Instead, the United States should consider how it can make an end to the war more likely given current Russian leadership.
美国不应将其战时政策建立在希望普京被一位结束乌克兰战争的*取代的基础上。
The United States should not base its wartime policy on the hope that Putin will be replaced with a leader that will end the war in Ukraine.
What is the status of the refugee situation? What can be done? 难民状况如何？能做些什么？霍林斯卡：数以百万计的乌克兰人仍然在国内外流离失所。毫无疑问，他们的决策将基于许多因素，包括乌克兰在他们回国时可能提供的激励措施。目前，乌克兰的公开讨论在胡萝卜（可能创造的机会）和大棒（留下来并亲身经历过战争的人优先或独家获得资源）之间波动。如果乌克兰想重建成为一个经济繁荣的民主国家，说服居住在国外的受过高等教育和创业的乌克兰人回国的能力可能至关重要。
HOLYNSKA Millions of Ukrainians remain displaced either internally or abroad. Their decision calculus will undoubtedly be based on many factors, including the incentives Ukraine might offer in case of their return. Currently, the public discussions in Ukraine fluctuate between carrots (opportunities that might be created) and sticks (priority or exclusive access to resources to those who remained and experienced the war firsthand). If Ukraine wants to rebuild as a democracy with a prosperous economy, the ability to convince highly educated and entrepreneurial Ukrainians living abroad to return might be crucial.
What options exist for rebuilding Ukraine after the end of hostilities? 在敌对行动结束后重建乌克兰有哪些选择？沙茨：乌克兰的重建工作将取决于美国和欧洲的联合领导，由乌克兰自己确定优先事项。需要有强有力的安全安排来阻止俄罗斯再次发动袭击，并为了重建的目的，让投资者相信他们可以承担风险，他们的投资将是安全的。美国应该在安全问题上发挥领导作用，而欧洲应该在改革和经济复苏问题上发挥主导作用，特别是因为乌克兰将同时努力加入欧盟。
SHATZ A Ukraine rebuilding effort will depend on U.S. and European joint leadership, with Ukraine itself setting the priorities. There will need to be strong security arrangements to deter Russia from attacking again and, for purposes of reconstruction, to give investors confidence that they can take risks and that their investments will be secure. The United States should take the lead on security, while Europe should take the lead on reform and economic recovery, especially since Ukraine will be simultaneously working toward membership in the European Union.
霍林斯卡：乌克兰战后重建的成功并不亚于积极敌对行动的结束。重建成本高昂，因此乌克兰政府必须确保其所做过程和决策的透明度。政府有能力让所有利益攸关方——包括西方和乌克兰充满活力的民间社会——参与决策过程，并明确沟通和解释所做的选择，这对于确保许多人为自由民主的乌克兰所做的牺牲得到尊重至关重要。
HOLYNSKA Success of Ukraine's postwar rebuilding is no less important than the end of active hostilities. Rebuilding will be costly, so the Ukrainian government must ensure transparency of the process and decisions it makes. The ability of the government to involve all stakeholders—including the West and Ukrainian vibrant civil society—in the decisionmaking process and to clearly communicate and explain the choices made is crucial to ensure that the sacrifices made by many for a free and democratic Ukraine are honored.
威廉·考特尼是兰德公司的兼职高级研究员，曾任美国驻哈萨克斯坦、格鲁吉亚和美国-苏联执行《禁试条约》委员会大使。
拉斐尔·s·科恩是兰德公司空军项目战略与条令项目主任，也是兰德公司的高级政治学家。
Miranda Priebe是美国大战略分析中心主任，也是兰德公司的高级政治学家。
安·(戴利是兰德公司的政策研究员，美国陆军预备役军官，曾在国防部长办公室担任俄罗斯战略高级顾问。
霍华德·J·沙茨是兰德公司的高级经济学家，也是Pardee RAND研究生院的政策分析教授。
布莱恩·弗雷德里克是兰德公司空军项目战略与条令项目的副主任，也是兰德公司的高级政治学家。
Marta Kepe是兰德公司的高级国防分析师。
彼得·威尔森是兰德公司的一名兼职高级国际和国防研究员
William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND and was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the U.S.-USSR commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
Raphael S. Cohen is director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE and a senior political scientist at RAND.
Miranda Priebe is director of the Center for Analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy and a senior political scientist at RAND.
Ann Dailey is a policy researcher at RAND, an officer in the U.S. Army Reserves, and served as senior advisor for Russia strategy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Howard J. Shatz is a senior economist at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.
Bryan Frederick is associate director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program within RAND Project AIR FORCE and a senior political scientist at RAND.
Marta Kepe is a senior defense analyst at RAND.
Peter A. Wilson is an adjunct senior international and defense researcher at RAND and teaches a course on the history of military technological innovation at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute.
James Black is assistant director of the Defence and Security research group at RAND Europe.
Khrystyna Holynska is a Ph.D. candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an assistant policy researcher at RAND.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/02/two-years-after-russia-invaded-ukraine.html
(The RAND Blog)
February 19, 2024
